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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN LATIN AMERICA
PHANOR J. EDER--
Judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is only a
minor part of the governmental structure in most of the Latin Ameri-
can countries, but its importance has been steadily growing.
Judicial review or "jurisdictional control," as it is usually styled,
has assumed a variety of forms, encountering obstacles in realization,
evidencing increasing, if intermittent, realization of democratic ideals,
introducing innovations worthy of serious investigation for adaptation
in other countries. A vast volume of law has been developed with
which it is impossible to deal in a short paper. Only flashlights will
be here attempted, in an endeavor to stimulate interest and research.
I have made little effort to keep up to the minute. Generalizations
must perforce be pardoned, notwithstanding that we are dealing with
a score of countries differing in geographical, historical, ethnical, eco-
nomic and social factors, despite the existence of superficial resem-
blances and a common legal colonial background.1 The progress,
or lack of progress, of judicial review can be understood only in the
light of the infinitely complex background with which it is confronted.
Some countries have been well governed over long periods of time.
A few have displayed an almost uninterrupted record of anarchy,
corruption, or malevolent dictatorship and a disregard of the rule of
law.
The colonial background of the Spanish American republics did
not prepare them for self-government on a national scale. At first,
the colonies were treated as an appanage, the personal property of
the Crown. Spain was abandoning democratic government to become
an absolute monarchy. The voices of the theological jurists that the
King was subject to the law were raised in vain 2 It had not always
been so. Spain, especially in the Kingdom of Aragon, had attained
parliamentary government and a respect for individual freedom before
England. The Justiciar or chief justice of Aragon, had power to
annul the unconstitutional acts of the King and to protect the liberty
of the individual and his property rights against the unlawful acts of
the King's officials.3 But in Castille, there was no judicial officer
* Member of the firm of Hardin, Hess, & Eder, New York City.
1 Brazil, Haiti and Santo Domingo excepted.
2 Natural Law was considered of a higher hierarchy than positive law. The
Partidas proclaimed "Against natural law no privilege or Charter of Emperor, King
or other lord, . . . should be valid" (Part. 3, fit. 18, L. 31).
3 2 Hallam, View of the State of Europe During the Middle Ages, Ch. IV (N.Y.
ed. 1863); 1 Prescott, Ferdinand & Isabella, Introd. sect. II, 58-103 (1838); 1 Linares
Quintana, 35 seq., 5 id. 342 seq. Reference is made to two modem works (not seen),
JUDICIAL REVIEW
vested with the prestige and power of the Justiciar of Aragon, and it
was the law of Castille that was made the law for the colonies. The
powers of the King, represented by the Viceroy (or Captain General
in the less important provinces) were absolute, tempered only by the
autonomy of the municipal councils or ayuntamientos and by an
underlying respect for law or at least for legal formalities. It was in
the local ayuntamientos or cabildos that the declarations of inde-
pendence first rang out and where the earliest constitutions were
drafted.
These early constitutions, ephemeral and for the most part never
actually in force, due to the war for independence, are nevertheless
of historical importance. They furnished the basis or the pattern for
the later constitutions. The idealists who drafted them, without
experience of government, in revolt against Spanish political insti-
tutions, naturally turned to foreign sources. The bills of rights, or
individual guarantees, were copied from the French Declaration of
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 4-the federal and the presi-
dential systems were taken from the United States. The United States
Constitution offered a seductive mirage to the inexpert Latin Ameri-
can republics. It was the text only of the United States Constitution,
not the practice under it, that was known to these early founding
fathers, and in the bare text of our constitution, there is no express
provision for judicial review. The Spanish law remained in force and
the practices of the courts and the modes of Spanish legal thinking
continued with little change until the adoption of their own codes
modeled on the Codes Napoleon, later in the 19th century.
It is difficult to assign priority for the introduction of judicial
review. As far as my research discloses, priority, at least on paper,
must be assigned to the State Constitution of Yucatan, Mexico, of
1841, which introduced the amparo for the protection of individual
rights. The draftsman Rejon, and later Otero, were influenced by
de Tocqueville, to whom the Latin Americans were indebted for their
first knowledge of the working of our system.5 Haiti's constitution
of 1843 (art. 162) provided judicial review. Bolivia's constitution of
La Sala, Examen Historico Foral de la Constitucion Aragonesa, 2 v. Madrid, 1868; Lopez
de Haro, Carlos, La Constitucion y Libertades de Aragon. Madrid, 1926. John Dickin-
son in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 alluded to the Justiciary of Aragon which
through the power to set aside the laws "became by degrees the law-giver." Deener,
"Judicial Review in Modern Political Systems," 46 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1079, 1080 (1952).
4 Narifio published a translation in Bogotai in 1793. A translation published in
Guadaloupe circulated in Venezuela in 1797; another was published in Caracas in 1811.
5 A translation was published by Sinchez de Bustamente in 1837. La Democracia
en ]a America Del Norte; others by Leopoldo Borda, Paris, 1842, and L. Roa de
Brandaris, Madrid, 1843. There have been numerous later translations or editions.
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1851 was the first in Spanish America to expressly provide for judicial
review-the courts were to apply the constitution in preference to
the laws (art. 82) and the 1861 constitution (art. 65(2)) vested in the
Supreme Court the power to "hear in sole instance matters of pure
law, the decision of which depends on the constitutionality or uncon-
stitutionality of laws, decrees or resolutions of any kind,"' but it is
not clear when use was first made of this power.
It was taken for granted under the 1853 Constitution of Argen-
tina, the Latin American constitution that most closely followed that
of the United States, that the United States practice would be fol-
lowed. This consitution did not become effective until it was adhered
to, with amendments, by the province of Buenos Aires in 1860; the
Judiciary Act was passed in 1863; the Supreme Court was organized
and the first decisions upholding this judicial power were rendered in
that year.
Other countries followed by incorporating judicial review in one
form or another in their constitutions: Venezuela 1858, 1893; Colom-
bia 1886, 1910; El Salvador 1886; Costa Rica 1871, 1917; Brazil
1891; Nicaragua 1893; the United States of Central America 1898;
Cuba 1901; Panama and Honduras 1904; Guatemala 1921; Chile
1925; Uruguay 1934.
There are earlier instances than those we have cited, in the
constitutions, of an express or implied power of judicial review, but
they do not seem to have been acted on.
7
POWER EXPRESsLY OR IMPLIEDLY DENIED
The power to interpret the constitution was expressly vested in
the Legislature in the early constitutions of Colombia-1821 (art.
189-the then Colombia included Venezuela and Ecuador). 1830
(art. 189), 1832 (art. 213), 1843 (art. 169), 1853 (art. 57); of Chile,
1833 (art. 164); and in all the constitutions of Ecuador from 1835
on; Mexico 1824 (art. 165); Uruguay 1830 (art. 152) and 1918
(art. 156); Venezuela 1830 (art. 224).
The exclusive power to interpret the laws authoritatively (and
hence by implication to interpret the constitution) was expressly
6 A provision that has been followed in all subsequent constitutions; in the 1945
constitution it is contained in art. 143, par. 5.
7 Venezuela 1811 (ch. 4, sec. 2; art. 2, ch. 9); the Constitutional Bases of the
Central American Federation (1823, art. 188(1)) Decree No. 76 (1839) of Guatemala's
Declaration of the Rights of the State and of its Inhabitants (art. 11); Costa Rica
1821, art. 41; 1825, art. 8; 1844, art. 5; 1859, art. 11; Ecuador 1845, art. 39 (eliminated
in later constitutions); Dominican Republic 1844; Nicaragua 1838, art. 37 (which con-
tains the germ of the "popular" action) and art. 45; 1854, arts. 79, 89; Peru 1856, art.
10.
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vested in the Legislature by the Cadiz Constitution of 1812 (art. 131),
Brazil (1824, art. 15(8)), several constitutions of Guatemala or
amendments thereto (1825, art. 94(1)); 1879 (art. 54(1)), 1921
(art. 54(1));8 Peru 1856 (art. 55), 1860 (art. 59), 1920; Nicaragua
1826 (art. 81(1)); and later constitutions; by early constitutions in
Colombia; Tunja 1811 (sec. 1, Ch. 3, art. 10); Cundinamarca 1812
(tit. IV, art. 30); Cartagena 1812 (tit. VI, art. 15); Antioquia 1815
(tit. 3, art. 10); Paraguay 1870 (art. 163); Uruguay 1830 (art. 152)
and 1918 (art. 156); Haiti, 1946 (art. 78).
The Ecuador Constitution of 1906 (art. 7) categorically states
that only the Congress can declare whether a law or legislative decree
is constitutional or not. The Judiciary Law of 1922 makes it an
attribute of the Supreme Court to resolve the doubts of the superior
courts as to the meaning of any law with the duty to submit such
doubts to the Congress.'
The Colombian Constitution of 1886 gave no power of judicial
review of enacted statutes. Its chief drafstman, Caro, echoing Rous-
seau, 10 expressed the opinion that it was improbable, nay impossible,
that the Legislature should pass an unconstitutional statute.
The express denial of judicial review stems from the French Con-
stitution of 1791 (Title 3, Ch. 5, art. 3) and the Cadiz Constitution
of 1812 (art. 246), which prohibited the courts from suspending the
execution of the laws."
This power of Congress to interpret the constitution and the
laws harmonizes with the spirit of French law. Hostility to judicial
legislation was a reaction of the revolution against former practices
and was embodied in article 5 of the Napoleonic Civil Code which
forbids judges when giving judgment to lay down general principles
or rules of conduct, a provision to be found in several of the Latin
American codes. More important perhaps, it harmonized with the
thought processes of Latin American lawyers-during the colonial
period, only the King could enact and authoritatively interpret' 2 the
8 Adding the proviso "but without violating the constitution."
9 Somewhat analogous provisions as to consulting Congress were to be found in
the Mexican Constitution of 1835-1836 (Ch. 5, art. 12(XV)), the Dominican Constitu-
tion of 1844. In Haiti, provision is made, without prejudice however to vested rights,
for an interpretation of the constitution or laws by the Legislative Chambers either
spontaneously or at the request of either of the parties engaged in a pending case
(1946, art. 111). The Tunja (Colombia) Constitution of 1811 provided "The Executive
and Judicial Powers must abide by the letter of the law and in case of doubt must
consult the Legislature (Ch. 4, art. 4).
10 "One need not ask . . . if the law can be unjust, since no one is unjust to
himself." Du Contract Social, Livre I, Ch. VI.
11 Reproduced in Maximilian's Provisional Statute for the Mexican Empire (1865).
12 Even prior to the colonial era the right of the King to interpret the laws was
elaborately expounded in the Ordenamiento de AIcali de Henares (1386) tit. 28.
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laws as the authority of the Cortes or Parliament had ebbed to the
vanishing point.
But all the constitutions recognized the supremacy of the con-
stitution. Its guardianship was left not to the courts, but again under
the influence of the Rousseau doctrines and the French constitutions,
either to the Legislature or to a permanent committee of the Legis-
lature or to a senate, which might be either a branch of the legislature
or a separate body. The idea was not alien to our own early thought.13
We may note a few instances of this attempt at legislative
guardianship of the constitution. Joseph Bonaparte's Constitution of
Bayonne for Spain (1808) provided (art. 39) that the Senate should
watch over the preservation of individual liberty and freedom of the
press. The Cadiz Constitution of 1812, in force in several of the
colonies, provided for a permanent Committee of the Parliament
(Cortes) 14 one of whose functions was to watch over the observance
of the constitution and the laws and to report any violations to the
next session of the Cortes (art. 160(1)).
The Brazilian Constitution of 1824 made the General Assembly
the guardian of the constitution.
Antedating the Cadiz Constitution, Colombia's first constitution,
that of Cundinamarca in 1811, provided for a Senate composed of
the Vice-President and four other members "of censure and pro-
tection to sustain the Constitution and the rights of the people." It
was the highest court and its primary duty was to watch exact com-
pliance with the constitution and prevent violation of the impre-
scriptible rights of the people. It could act either on its own initiative
or upon complaint of any citizen. This latter provision is a precedent
for Colombia's present-day "popular action." It included special
13 The Councils of Censorship and Revision in New York (1777-1821) and Illinois
(1818-1847) proved of some effect in enforcing constitutional limitations; not so the
Council of Censors in Pennsylvania (1776, arts. 46, 47) and Vermont (1777-1869, s.
44). Meader, The Council of Censors (Providence, 1899). The Senate, together with
judges, in New York until 1846 and in New Jersey until 1946 was the court of ultimate
appeal. Under the New Jersey Constitution of 1776, the Governor and Council consti-
tuted the court of last resort.
14 The Permanent Committee is deeprooted in Spanish history; it dates from the
12th century in Aragon, was copied in other Spanish Kingdoms and reproduced, in
addition to the Cadiz Constitution, in early constitutions of Argentina, Uruguay, Chile,
Peru and Venezuela, and is to be found today in Panama, Guatemala, Haiti, Uruguay,
Mexico. TENA 384-388 (4th ed.). Tena is often critical of the Mexican system. The
only fault I have to find with his excellent work is that he has taken as gospel truth
some questionable assertions of Corwin whose book has been translated into Spanish
as "La Constitucion Norteamericana y su Actual Significado," Buenos Aires, 1942, and
of some continental writers whose knowledge of our system is often superficial or out
of date.
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provisions as to the veto power on the ground of unconstitutionality.
This also is a precedent for provisions in the 1886 constitution.
The 1825 Constitution of Costa Rica vested in the Congress
exclusively the attribute to watch over the Federal and Costa Rican
state constitutions and the laws (art. 55), but it also provided a Poder
Conservador with the same duty, but reporting to Congress (art. 68).
The Mexican Constitution of 1836, following the pattern of the
French Senat Conservateur,15 also provided for a supreme Poder
Conservador-a veritable fourth power, which had the power to de-
clare the nullity of unconstitutional acts of any of the three powers
upon demand of any one of them.
The Constitution of Quito, Ecuador, 1812 made the Supreme
Congress a tribunal of censure and vigilance for the guardianship of
the constitution (art. 10) and under the Ecuador Constitution of
1843, the Permanent Commission had the duty of watching over the
observance of the constitution and of the laws, reporting to the
President and to Congress. This duty was assigned to the Council
of State in the 1851 constitution (art. 82) and the 1929 constitution
(art. 117).
Nearly all these attempts to have a political body assume the
guardianship of the constitution were doomed to failure-a notorious
instance was that of the Mexican Fourth Power, which led to the
dictatorship of Santa Anna. Elsewhere, these political organs were
innocuous or inactive. The failure paved the way for adopting the
principle of judicial review.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Now let us cast a glance at the constitutional and statutory pro-
visions for judicial review, and the actual practice in several countries.
Argentina
Although it is the country with the longest history of judicial
review, with the exception of the United States, only a brief survey is
here necessary, since Amadeo's excellent book, readily accessible,
covers the subject. The supremacy of the constitution laid down in
article 31, substantially taken from the United States Constitution, is
maintained by the Supreme Court through the extraordinary remedy
(recurso extraordinario) analogous to our former writ of error. The
implementing statute, Law 48 of 1863, was modeled on the American
Judiciary Act of 1789.' An adversary "suit" is necessary involving
10 Constitution of Year VIII (1799), art. 21. See Jaffin, New World Constitutional
Harmony," 42 Col. L. Rev. 532, 555-557 (1942).
16 President Mitre commissioned Dr. Manuel Rafael Garcia to study the judicial
1960]
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justiciable issues; but "suit" is not limited to a purely judicial con-
troversy; the writ lies, for example from the final decision of a chief
of police. The federal question must be pleaded or raised during
the course of the suit below. As in the United States, all courts, both
provincial (state) and federal, can pass upon constitutional questions.
The constitutions of the provinces expressly authorize their state
supreme courts to declare laws unconstitutional." From its very in-
ception, in 1863 and 1864, the Federal Supreme Court asserted its
right to declare laws unconstitutional. In 1863, it declared a presi-
dential decree to be unconstitutional. In 1869 and 1871, the Supreme
Court protected property and contractual rights against unconsti-
tutional encroachments by provincial governments; in the former case,
declaring unconstitutional a provincial statute depriving plaintiff of
his property; in the latter case overruling a governor's decree order-
ing dissolution of a charitable society. It was not until 1887 that an
act of Congress was held unconstitutional; Congress, it was held,
could not change the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, granted
by the constitution, in any manner whatsoever. In a case in the
following year, it held that in a statute authorizing condemnation
(expropriation), Congress had exceeded its powers.
Only a party affected by the alleged unconstitutional statute or
act of the Executive can question their constitutionality. No person
can attack the constitutionality of a statute unless his economic in-
terests or legal rights have been violated by the enforcement of the
statute in question.
Until very recently,"8 one striking feature in the Argentine
decisions is the extent to which our decisions and constitutional
authorities have been cited or quoted, 9 and, except where there was
a difference in the text of the constitution, 0 have been followed.
On numerous occasions, the court has acknowledged this in-
debtedness. The provisions of the constitution protecting property
system of the United States. His report was the basis for Law 48. It was published
in Florence in 1863, Estudio Sobre la Aplicacion de la Justicia Federal Norteamericana
a Ia Organizacion Constitucional Argentina.
17 For the older constitutions see Digesto Constitucional Argentino (1941). For a
study and comparison of the more recent constitutions, Dana Montafio, El 'Estado de
Derecho' en la Rep6blica Argentina," La Ley, Dec. 22, 1958, 1-6.
18 In a recent volume of the Supreme Court reports examined, I found no citation
of American authorities.
19 For translations of American writers see Nadelmann, "A Propos of Translations,"
8 Am. J. Comp. L. 204 (1959).
20 44 sections of the two constitutions are practically identical, 22 similar, 48 are
different and 60 sections of the Argentine Constitution are not found in the American.
Linares Quintana, "Comparison of United States and Argentine Constitutional Systems,"
97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 641-664 (1948-9).
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rights have been interpreted in the light of the substantive and pro-
cedural concepts of due process of law enunciated by our Supreme
Court. The provision in our Constitution prohibiting the states from
impairing the obligation of contracts is not found in the Argentine
Constitution, but the Argentine Supreme Court has decided, both as
to the provinces and Congress, that contractual rights are property'
rights and cannot be impaired without violating the property clauses
of the constitution. In applying the principle of equal protection in
tax matters, the court has generally followed the precedents estab-
lished by the Supreme Court of the United States.2l
A few recent decisions on the extraordinary remedy may be
cited, out of the hundreds in the reports and legal periodicals, to
illustrate current practices and problems. The courts have upheld
the power of Congress to reasonably regulate the professions 2 and
the power of Congressional committees to compel witnesses to appear,
without prejudice however to the right against self-incrimination. 23
As a general rule, the extraordinary remedy does not lie against ad-
ministrative resolutions, except where an administrative officer exer-
cises judicial or quasi-judicial functions..2 4 A statute restricting free
choice of first names for children was declared, in part, unconstitu-
tional1 - Congress or the provincial legislatures may reduce pensions,
provided the reduction be not arbitrary or confiscatory 26
Statutes suspending summary proceedings for eviction against
tenants were held unconstitutional 2 7 De Seze v. Gobierno NacionaPs
declared void a Presidential decree revoking a grant of public lands.
In several decisions, the court upheld strictly the requirement of
full, prior compensation in eminent domain cases 29
21 Amadeo 194-220. A comparable book in English on the other major countries,
especially Brazil and Mexico, is needed. Amadeo is highly laudatory of the Argentine
Supreme Court, and rightly so. The court suffered an eclipse in popular esteem during
the Peron regime, but is regaining its former prestige.
22 Re Peterffy, S.C. Feb. 11, 1959; La Ley, Sept. 10, 1959, 5.
23 Habeas Corpus, re Mendola, C.N. Fed. Capital, Apr. 3, 1959; La Ley, Sept. 8,
1959, 5.
24 Re Comisi6n Administradora S.C. Dec. 30, 1958; 242 Fallos Corte Suprema 542
(hereinafter cited Fallos) ; re David Hogg y Cia., Dec. 1, 1958, 242 Fallos 353 (involv-
ing the constitutional right to strike).
2 Eder, "The Right to Choose a Name," 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 502 (1960).
26 Aguirre v. Province of Santa F6, Oct. 29, 1958; 242 Fallos 141.
27 Neumayer v. Cejas, C. App., Rosario, Feb. 4, 1959; La Ley Apr. 15, 1959, with
dissenting opinion that such statutes fell within the police power.
28 Sept. 24, 1958; 241 Fallos 384, citing U.S. cases.
29 But see re Deg6, S.C. Oct. 20, 1958; 242 Falos 73 (with dissenting opinions).
In our own law, it is often difficult to distinguish between the ratio decidendi of a case
and obiter dicta. This case illustrates the even greater difficulty when we deal with
foreign decisions.
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As a general rule, the Supreme Court will not admit the ex-
traordinary remedy based on merely procedural questions or ques-
tions of fact and will return the case to the lower courts for final
decision, but it will on occasion, where the case is clear, render final
decision.30
A retired officer is subject to the Code of Military Justice in
respect of acts committed in a military establishment, including a
hotel." In a criminal libel action, the refusal to permit evidence of
"public interest" was held to be a violation of the constitutional
guarantee (art. 18) of the right of defense. 2
The power to tax, the court holds emphatically, is not the power
to destroy. Progressive taxes are not per se unconstitutional, neither
is a surtax based on absentee ownership, but an inheritance tax of
more than a third of the value of the property transmitted is con-
fiscatory and unconstitutional; it would make the right of inheritance,
guaranteed by the constitution, illusory? 3
In a dictum, the court rejects the theory of Duguit that property
is a social function--"a theory that would lead to the negation of
subjective rights, among others the right of property."34 The Argen-
tine court has been zealous in guarding the right to defense in court.
This right extends to proceedings before administrative authorities
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."
The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under articles 100
and 101 of the constitution can neither be enlarged nor abridged.36
Bolivia3
1
We have already noted that Bolivia was the first of our countries
to expressly provide for judicial review in its constitution, and have
30 Naci6n Argentina v. di Rosa, S.C. Oct. 1, 1958; 242 Fallos 11, in effect over-
ruling previous decisions.
31 Re Gonzalez Victoria, S.C. Sept. 10, 1958; 241 Fallos 342; La Ley Apr. 20,
1959, 6. The note in La Ley disagrees, holding that a civilian is never subject to military
law.
32 Stad v. Alemin, S.C. July 2, 1958; 241 Fallos 65.
33 Re Synge, Sept. 21, 1956, 235 Fallos Corte Suprema 883; but a tax of 50% on
royalties received by foreign film companies was sustained. Fox Film v. Nad6n, 23
June, 1955, 232 Fallos 52.
34 O'Neill v. Heguiabeher, 13 April, 1956; 234 Fallos 384. Duguit's theory, and to
a wider extent than he contemplated, has been incorporated in most of the recent Latin
American constitutions.
35 Barbero v. Ruiz, 16 Nov. 1955; 233 Fallos 74 (rent board).
36 Re Garay Vivas, May 30, 1956; 234 Fallos 791.
37 Paz, Luis: Constitucion Politica de Ia Republica de Bolivia. Sucre, 1912. Trigo,
Ciro Felix: (1) Derecho Constitucional Boliviana. La Paz, 1952 (printed in Argentina) ;
(2) Las Constituciones de Bolivia. Madrid, 1958 (bibliog. IX-XIII). Cleven: The
Political Organization of Bolivia. Washington, 1940.
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quoted the pertinent provisions of the constitutions of 1851 and
1861. In the 1947 constitution, the provision appears as art. 145(2).
If the constitutional issue arises in a lower court, the record,
after the parties have submitted their evidence and briefs, is sent to
the Supreme Court for decision. The plaintiff must allege and prove
a direct personal, not a merely speculative, injury arising from the
law or its application. The defendant may be either a private person
or the public official applying the law or the resolution. The 1945
constitution, as amended in 1947, provides that the ordinary courts
may decide direct actions to declare the nullity of the acts of those
who usurp functions or exercise jurisdiction or power not emanating
from the law (arts. 27, 142). The principles, rights and guaranties
recognized in this constitution, cannot be altered by the laws regulat-
ing their exercise and do not need prior regulations for their execution
(i.e. they are self-executing (art. 28)) . s The authorities and courts
shall apply the constitution in preference to statutes (art. 182). The
Supreme Court (art. 145) also takes cognizance, in sole instance, of
suits against resolutions of the Legislative Power or of one of its
Chambers, when such resolutions affect one or more concrete rights,
either civil or political, and regardless of who may be the interested
person.
In most constitutions, some inconsistent provisions are to be
found. Perhaps none is more striking than a Bolivian instance. In
addition to judicial review, the constitution adheres to the oft-re-
peated formula authorizing the Congress to interpret the constitution.
In its present form (art. 181 of the 1947 constitution) it reads: "The
Chambers may resolve any doubt that may arise as to the meaning
of one or more articles of the Constitution." A two-thirds majority
vote is required and such interpretative laws cannot be vetoed by the
President. Congress has on occasion exercised this power. A law of
September 6, 1898 interpreted article 47 of the then constitution as
to immunities of Senators and Deputies. A law of December 1, 1931
interpreted the articles of the constitution as to the qualifications of
deputies.39 A law of December 20, 1948 declares "Article 31 of the
Political Constitution of the State is interpreted in the sense that
the non-retroactivity which it proclaims does not apply to the social
laws." This practically repeals the prohibition against retroactivity.40
38 In one case however, the Supreme Court refused to apply a constitutional pro-
vision recognizing illegitimate children in the absence of a statute defining the procedure
for filiation proceedings.
39 Trigo (2), op. cit. supra note 37, note to article 65.
40 Trigo (2), op. cit. supra note 37, note to article 31; Trigo (1), op. cit. supra note
37 at 55.
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The Supreme Court had one era of grandeur beginning in 1880,
when its decisions were enriched by the principles and practices of
the Supreme Court of the United States.4 Since that era it would
appear that very few laws have been declared unconstitutional.
Brazil and the Writ of Security
Brazil inherited the law of Portugal. Its first constitution (1824)
after independence, known as the Imperial Constitution, setting up a
limited monarchy, was largely modeled on the British system. Hence,
judicial review was not contemplated. Despite this lack, Brazil was
probably better governed under the Empire than it has been as a
republic.
The first constitution of the Republic (1891) vested in the
Supreme Court the right to review decisions of the state courts by
a procedure, in essence similar to our writ of error under the judiciary
Act of 1789. This remedy, as in the Argentine, became known as the
"extraordinary remedy." Article 60 vested in all federal courts the
power to adjudge cases where a party either by action or defense
raised a constitutional issue. State courts also passed upon constitu-
tionality when that issue was involved with other questions. But,
differing from the United States rule, if the plaintiff based his action
directly and exclusively on a precept of the federal constitution,
competence was vested solely in the federal courts.43
The Brazilian Constitution of 1891 was derived chiefly from the
Imperial Constitution. It took from the United States the principle
of federalism with its concomitant judicial power. The example of
the United States was a potent influence in other respects. Rui
Barbosa, the chief author, was a profound student of our constitu-
tional system, as have been several later jurists. More important was
the fact that in working out the doctrine of judicial review, our
Supreme Court decisions and constitutional authorities were generally
followed.
Law 221 of 1894, art. 13, s. 10, gave the courts the power to re-
fuse to apply "manifestly unconstitutional" laws. The Supreme Court
exercised the power on occasion. Following the practice of the courts,
full review was incorporated in the 1926 amendments (art. 60, s. 1)
and was made still more explicit in the 1934 constitution.
41 Trigo (1), op. cit. supra note 37 at 661 et seq.
42 Jacques, Curso de Direito Constitucional (Rio 1956); James, The Constitutional
System of Brazil (1923); Marchant, "The Brazilian Writ of Security," 19 Tul. L. Rev.
213-228 (1944); Pacheco, Tratado das Constituicoes Brasileiras, 2 v. Rio-Sao Paulo
1958; Pontes de Miranda: Wald.
43 Lessa, Pedro: Direito Constitutcional Brasileiro. Do Poder Judiciario, 102, 132,
Rio 1915 (the classical work).
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It is not surprising that in the first thirty years of the Republic,
there should have been only a few instances of this power, especially
as it was an institution wholly foreign to the system of law and
government which preceded the republic.4 But a recent author states
that no less than twenty federal laws and ten state laws have been
declared unconstitutional "which proves the vigor and efficiency of
judicial control" (words in English) .4 He fails to weigh this against
the number where constitutionality has been upheld.
More effective in practice to protect constitutional liberties than
the extraordinary remedy was the surprising development given in
Brazil by the courts to the writ of habeas corpus to enforce all con-
stitutional guarantees-"habeas corpus disembodied" we may well
call it.46 The constitutional amendment of 1926 restricting habeas
corpus to its original purpose to protect freedom of locomotion,
wrecked the Brazilian habeas corpus as a means to protect all liberties.
"The door that the courts had opened being now closed, it was neces-
sary to open another"; 4 7 the idea of a general writ of security
(mandado de seguranca) was brought forward and incorporated in
the 1934 constitution.
In its present form (constitution of 1946, art. 141(24)), the
constitutional provision reads:
Writs of security shall be granted in order to protect clear
and certain rights not protected by habeas corpus regardless of
what authority may be responsible for the illegality or abuse of
power.
Illegality here includes unconstitutionality.
The procedure was regulated by Law 191 of January 16, 1936,
later included in the Code of Civil Procedure (arts. 319-331) amended
by Law 1533 of December 31, 1951.
Brazilian law is eclectic, derived from many sources. The writ
of security was adopted as a successor to a summary special pro-
cedure in administrative matters, and drawing on the Brazilian
doctrine of habeas corpus, on the theory of possessory rights as
developed in Brazil and on foreign sources especially the Mexican
amparo, American law and the French theory of abuse of rights.
At the beginning there was some confusion in the cases as to
whether the proper remedy was habeas corpus or the writ of security.
44 James, op. cit supra note 42 at 9, 10, 107.
45 Jacques, op. cit. supra note 42 at 279.
46 See Eder, "Habeas Corpus Disembodied; the Latin American Experience," in
XXth Century Comparative and Conflicts Law-Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E.
Yntema (in press).
47 Pontes de Miranda, op. cit. supra note 42 at 235.
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But this has now been clearly settled by the courts. Habeas corpus
lies only against interference, actual or threatened, with freedom
of locomotion. Habeas corpus was denied when the outlawed Com-
munist Party brought the writ against the President of the Republic
in an attempt to continue its existence as a political party. The
Supreme Court said the plaintiff's rights could be decided only under
a writ of security48 (which apparently was no longer available).
The writ of security is a new institution in jurisprudence, typi-
cally and natively Brazilian, without a parallel elsewhere in the world.
The principles of our writs of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and injunction are all embraced in the single Brazilian writ of
security. 9
It is available for the protection of any certain and incontestable
right threatened or violated by an act of any authority manifestly
unconstitutional or illegal. It does not lie for acts where an adminis-
trative appeal may be used which has the effect of a temporary stay,
nor against judicial orders or decisions where an appeal or other
procedural remedy is available, nor against disciplinary acts unless
exercised by an incompetent authority or without due process.
The term "any authority" in the constitution was broadly inter-
preted both by the courts and by the implementing laws. Under the
dictatorial constitution of 1937, the writ did not lie against the
President of the Republic or against members of the Cabinet. During
the Vargas dictatorship, the use of the writ died out, to be revived
without restrictions under the 1946 constitution. It lies against
administrative and executive authorities of all ranks, high or low,
and against legislative authorities. The writ (as in the case of the
Mexican amparo) never lies against private individuals unless they
are exercising public functions by delegation from the public power,
e.g. public utility companies and trade unions which are deemed to
be juristic persons of public, not private, law.
The writ must be asked within a term of 120 days; the defendant
must present a report and defence within 5 days; the Attorney
General's office is given 5 days within which to state its case and the
judge must give judgment within 5 days thereafter. Theoretically
the whole procedure takes only 15 days, but so great is the pressure
on the courts this rarely happens.
A stay, suspension or interlocutory injunction may be ordered.
The interlocutory injunction is of course of the utmost importance.
The documentary proof and other evidence must convince the
48 Wald, op. cit. supra note 42 at 49-51; 2 Pacheco, op. cit. supra note 42 at 55
et seq.
49 Wald, op. cit. supra note 42 at 73, 79.
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judge beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner has a clear and
definite right. There must be no uncertainty as to the facts. What
constitutes a certain and definite right has been the work of the courts
and the decisions are sometimes conflicting. Much is left to the
discretion of the trial judge; the Supreme Court lays down only
general standards and guides. The petitioner's clear right must be
determinable prima facie without any examination as to the facts.
The proceedings in this respect bear a resemblance to our motion for
summary judgment. But the fact that questions of law are com-
plicated and controversial does not prevent the grant of what the
courts call the "heroic" remedy.
The writ has preference on the court calendar over every other
action, except habeas corpus. The judge's order is enforced by a
contempt proceeding if disobeyed. A stay may be granted if an appeal
is filed. The denial of the writ is without prejudice to any other
remedy the petitioner may have.
The writ does not lie to test the constitutionality of a statute
per se, in the abstract. A concrete act on the part of a public authority
violating or threatening directly a right of the petitioner is a necessary
basis for the action. But a statute that is not truly legislative, but
is in essence an administrative act may be attacked by the writ. The
writ also lies when a statute is immediately self-enforcing or when,
though in a general form, it is really directed against a single person.
The tendency of the latest decisions seems to be, however, that a law
or a tax may be declared unconstitutional, without concrete ap-
plication, by means of the writ of security.
The law is not yet well settled as to the extent to which the writ
of security can be used against judicial acts. The prior controversy
was in part settled by Law 1533 of 1951. The writ does not lie against
a court order or decision where there is a remedy provided by the
procedural laws or the decision is open to revision. The statute has
been broadly construed to allow the writ when the ordinary procedural
remedy does not include a stay of proceedings.
The writ today (contrary to the rule in the United States) lies
against the President of the Republic, but only in the Supreme Court.
Against cabinet ministers, the Federal Court of Appeal is the com-
petent court of first instance.
It is in the field of taxation that the writ finds its greatest
application in today's practice, against unconstitutional or illegal
taxes, e.g. interstate export taxes or violations of income tax exemp-
tion granted to journalists and professors. In tax matters, the courts
have followed the maxim in dubio contra fiscum-a maxim we might
well adopt. However, the constitutional provision that the salaries
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of judges may not be reduced was held not to exempt them from the
incidence of the general income tax. Other tax cases also have given
rise to conflicts of opinion and dissenting opinions are frequent. The
courtesy with which the judges of the Supreme Court, with very rare
exceptions, treat their colleagues might well set an example for our
own judges. Progressive inflation in Brazil has caused increasing
difficulties and the use of the writ of security enjoining collection of
illegal or arbitrary impositions, instead of the older method of an
action for restitution, has served to mitigate injustice.
In urgent cases, the petition for the writ and notice to the
defendant authority may be made by telegram or radiogram (Law
1533, art. 4). Discovery may be ordered (art. 6, id.).
Article 200 of the constitution (taken from article 179, 1934
constitution) provides that only by the vote of an absolute majority
of all its members may a court declare a statute or act of the Public
Power unconstitutional. Prior to 1934, a majority of the judges
hearing the case was sufficient. As the Supreme Court is composed
of 11 judges, a doubt was raised whether "absolute majority" meant
6 or 7 (5y 2= 6, plus one). The latter view was upheld by the court
in 1948.50
The Brazilians are justly proud of their invention of the writ of
security. The difficulty with it, as in the case of the amparo in
Mexico, is that the courts are overburdened with applications and
have not the time to pass on them promptly.5'
Chile52
Chile differs laudably in many respects from most Latin Ameri-
can countries. Racial homogeneity, geographical isolation, external
security, the long duration of its chief constitution (1833 to 1925),
an uninterrupted series of presidential elections, a high level of in-
tellectual achievement and educational institutions of noteworthy
character, an independent judiciary of marked ability, a genuine
respect for law and other factors combined to give it a singular
position.
After an initial period of turmoil, the country achieved a stable
government under the 1833 constitution, an autocratic, aristocratic
50 Jacques, op. cit. supra note 42 at 273, 274.
51 Sa Freire, "Judicial Power," Inter-Am. Bar Ass. Proc. 10th Conference Buenos
Aires (B.A. 1958) 205, 210.
52 Amunategui Jordan: Carvajal Ravest, Horacio: La Corte Suprema. Santiago,
1940; Guerra: Constitucion de Chile de 1925. Santiago, 1929; Huneeus: Obras. Vol. 3.
Estudio sobre Derecho Constitucional Comparado. Santiago, 1891; Roldan, Alcibiades:
Elementos de Derecho Constitucional de Chile. Santiago, 1913; Shaw: The Early
Constitutions of Chile 1810-1833. New York, 1930.
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instrument of, by and for the upper classes on the model of the former
British system, with leaders conscious of their responsibility. Portales,
the author of this constitution, wrote:
Democracy is an absurdity in the (Latin) American coun-
tries; a strong central government, of men of model virtue and
patriotism (is what we need) to lead citizens towards order and
virtue. Not until these have been realized will the time be ripe for
a completely liberal government, free and full of ideals, in which
all citizens share.53
The constitution of 1925 (which really did not come into effect
until 1932) made radical changes. Among others, it introduced ju-
dicial review. Previously, judicial review had been generally thought
to be a violation of the doctrine of the separation of powers. Some
present-day Chilean writers and even the courts are still under the
influence of that concept.
The Supreme Court in 1848 asserted that no court in Chile had
power to declare laws unconstitutional. The supreme judgment of
the legislator that the law he enacts is not opposed to the constitution
dissipates all doubt in that regard and does not permit any delay in
the execution of the provisions of the law. 4 Nevertheless, several
clearly unconstitutional statutes were enacted.55
In a circular addressed by the Supreme Court to the courts of
appeal in 1867, it repeated this doctrine, but with a proviso that
altered it completely: preference should be given to the constitution
if a statute clearly and overtly conflicted with the constitution. Some
courts seem to have exercised the power.56 But the prevalent opinion
was that the courts had no power. Shortly before the adoption of the
1925 constitution, the appellant in an expropriation case invoked the
constitution. The court said:
Since in our constitutional system, there is no judicial au-
thority which has the power to declare the unconstitutionality of
the laws, the Court below . . . proceeded correctly in basing its
decision on the statute above cited.57
There was one exception to this negative attitude. A purported
statute that did not meet the constitutional requirements for enact-
ment, one that suffered from defects of form, not of substance, was
treated as a nullity-it was not a law. Defects of "form" were within
5 Guerra, op. cit. supra note 52 at 15.
54 Quoted in full in Roldan, op. cit. supra note 52 at 486.
55 Guerra, op. cit supra note 52 at 458.
56 Carvajal Ravest, op. cit. supra note 52 at 91, without, however, giving any
citation.
57 Martinez v. Fisco, Dec. 23, 1924; 24 Revista de Derecho y Legislacion 1418
(hereinafter cited as Rev. D.).
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the jurisdiction of the courts, but not those of substance. The Su-
preme Court refused to apply two paragraphs of article 95 of the
Judiciary Law which had been added by error."
The constitutional provision authorizing judicial review, article
86 of the 1925 constitution, reads:
The Supreme Court in private cases under its cognizance or
which may have been submitted to it on appeal interposed in a
case pending before any other court, may declare inapplicable to
the case any legal precept contrary to the Constitution. This appeal
may be taken at any stage of the case without suspending the
proceedings.
No statute regulating the procedure was passed but the Supreme
Court itself laid down the procedure in an Auto Acordado of May 22,
1932. A copy of the petition claiming unconstitutionality is served
on the defendants; whether they answer or not, the record is then
passed to the Attorney General (Fiscal). When he files his opinion,
the case is placed on the calendar for hearing and decision. The full
court sits to hear constitutional questions, nine judges constituting a
quorum.
Judicial review is vested exclusively in the Supreme Court. It is
deemed too delicate a matter to entrust to inferior courts. There
must be a judicial controversy, an actual case in the courts, and the
decision rendered applies only to the particular case.50
In the early years, very few appeals were successful. Carvajal
Ravest states only one.60 The court interpreted its powers under
article 86 very strictly. Of recent years, there seems to be a tendency
towards a more liberal construction, and declarations of unconsti-
tutionality have been more frequent.
The first important case involving judicial review seems to have
been that of de Castro.6' The court refused to declare unconstitu-
tional Law 4945 giving extraordinary powers of legislation to the
President. The Court laid down a rule of strict construction of the
new constitutional provision, which was consistently followed for
many years.
58 So stated in re Richards, Dec. 6, 1950; 47 Rev. D. 1-537 (1950), where the
court refused to use the remedy of unconstitutionality, which it holds, under the 1925
constitution, goes only to the substance of the law, not to its external form-the latter
merely presents a question of "illegality" for the ordinary courts. A purported law that
does not meet the requirements for due passage is not a law. And see Carvajal Ravest,
op. cit. supra note 52 and the Wilshaw case, infra.
59 Carvajal Ravest, op. cit. supra note 52 at 152. The influence of French writers
criticizing the United States system may have been at work, notably Lambert: Le
Gouvernement des Juges (1921).
60 At 156.
61 Sept. 13, 132; 30 Rev. D. 1-36 (1933).
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"Legal precept" or statutory precept in article 86, it held, meant
acts passed by Congress; not executive decrees. There have been
many decisions to that effect. But there is substantial dissent among
the authorities and some conflicting decisions as to whether the remedy
of article 86 applies to decrees or not.62
In the case of Willshaw,65 the court was faced with the problem
of a typographical error in the official publication (promulgation) of
a penal law, which aggravated the punishment to be imposed. The
appellant contended that there having been no due publication, the
law was not applicable. The court refused to set it aside.6
Unlike the rule in the Argentine, the question of unconsti-
tutionality does not have to be raised in the lower court.
5
There is no provision in the Chilean constitution against retro-
active legislation in civil matters. Retroactive laws as to taxation
and labor relations (payments and bonuses to employees) have been
repeatedly upheld by the court, except where there is a direct vio-
lation of property; to enjoy constitutional protection, there must be
a property right in a specific, corporeal thing. Article 9 of the Civil
Code against retroactivity is a statutory, not a constitutional, rule.
Retroactivity is permissible even though it may impair the obligation
of contracts. 6 But a law as to pensions of public employees was held
unconstitutional.
67
Provisions of the Labor Code as to burden of proof do not
infringe the constitutional guarantee of equality before the law.'
The court has been zealous to protect property rights, when
social welfare legislation is not involved. A law which authorized the
62 1 Repertorio de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia Chilena (n.d.), under article 1.
03 Dec. 7, 1935; 33 Rev. D. 11-1-209 (1936). The decision and reasoning of the
court are severely criticized by Claro Solar in id. 1-77-99 (a comparative study)-the
court failed to make use of its constitutional authority and disregarded the constitutional
provision embodying the principle of nulla poena sine lege.
64 The views of the Colombian Supreme Court are in accord. See Grant, "New
Jersey's 'Popular Action' in Rem to Control Legislative Procedure," 4 Rutgers L. Rev.
391-417 (1948-9).
(5 Salas Fernandez y Cia., 28 Sept. 1950; 47 Rev. D. 1-431.
66 Varela Varela: El Valor Constitucionel de la Ley No. 9581, 47 Rev. D. (1950)
60, esp. 70 et seq. Law 9581 increasing the Social Security tax was upheld. Pgrez, Dec.
28, 1951, 48 Rev. D. 1-620. "Compaiiia General de Electriddad," Jan. 6, 1951; 48 Rev.
D. 1-6, upheld a law granting bonuses to employees of private companies. The doc-
trine of the social function of property was invoked. Four judges dissented.
67 Romero Rojas, Jan. 7, 1952; 49 Rev. D. (1952) 1-6.
6s Zufiiga Latorre, Nov. 24, 1951; 48 Rev. D. III-65-one of the few cases in
which the court cites commentators. It never cites its own decisions, but in fact often
copies their language and follows them. In theory, in Latin American countries gen-
eraly, there is no rule of stare decisis. The practice, however, I have found to be
much like our own.
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President to cancel leases of public lands without judicial process
and to take possession was held unconstitutional. 9
Strict compliance with the constitutional provisions for just prior
compensation in cases of expropriation (condemnation for a public
use-the needs of the State are not sufficient as they are in some
other countries) has been consistently enforced by the court. An
expropriation law limiting the compensation to be paid to an amount
not in excess of 10% over the assessed value on the tax roll, providing
for payment in bonds and withdrawing valuation from the courts, is
unconstitutional. ° An article of the Expropriation Law providing for
premature possession by the pulic authorities was similarly held in-
valid. The right of "property" protected by the constitution includes
possession. Similarly a law providing for taking possession of lands
prior to payment of compensation was held bad.7 Law No. 8736 of
1947 depriving Indians of the right to sell their lands was held un-
constitutional as retroactive and constituting an unlawful deprivation
of property.72 A law permitting the Executive to declare leases in
the Magallanes territory to have been terminated by lapse was held
unconstitutional.73 A law reserving to the State certain mineral de-
posits, without prejudice to vested rights conferred under prior law,
was upheld. An exploration concession, it was held does not constitute
a vested right, but is a mere expectancy of obtaining title in the future.
"Property" means a real right in a corporeal thing to be enjoyed and
disposed of absolutely as owner.74 A mining tax law imposing a tax
of 50% of the royalties or rental received was held constitutional.75
69 Several cases, inter alia, Duncker, April 11, 1933; 30 Rev. D. 1-290. Sociedad
Agricola, Dec. 15, 1955; 52 Rev. D. 1-399. The court repeated the principle laid down
in earlier cases that "the remedy of unconstitutionality or inapplicability is of a purely
doctrinal character, since it does not give to the court any attribute other than to
determine by a simple comparison of the statute with the text of the constitution
whether there is a conflict; that is to say, the remedy does not decide any of the other
questions that are at issue in the suit and must be limited solely to decide if the law
attacked is to be applied therein or not. It is sufficient, in instituting the remedy, that
there be a possibility (certainty is not required) that an unconstitutional statute may
be applied to the matter in controversy. The court will not pass on the facts or the
evidence. Any other posture would lead to a review of the rights of action and de-
fenses on the merits at issue; this would denaturalize the purpose and character of the
proceeding which differs substantially from those of other appeals instituted in the
procedural Codes."
70 Several cases, inter alia, Arzobispado de Santiago, July 22, 1952; 49 Rev. D. 1-259.
71 De Voto Podesta, Nov. 28, 1955; 52 Rev. D. 1-376; Reyes Rioseco, Jan. 9,
1952; 49 Rev. D. 1-18.
72 Several cases, inter alia, Medina Belimar, May 24, 1955; 52 Rev. D. 1-118.
73 Curtze, Aug. 5, 1941; 39 Rev. D. II, 1-184.
74 Compafiia Salitrera, Jan. 14, 1943; 40 Rev. D. II, 1-459. There are Colombian
decisions to the same effect. The injustice would seem self-evident.
75 Sod6t6 Hauts Fourneaux, 12 May, 1948; 46 Rev. D. 2.J.6 (1949).
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A judicial controversy, that is an actual suit in a court of justice,
is required. Consequently, the court will not intervene in electoral
matters,76 nor in proceedings to remove a judge.77 If a suit has been
terminated and no appeal taken, article 86 cannot later be resorted
to.78
Colomb 79
Colombia is by far the most interesting country in Latin America
for the study of judicial review. It introduced in practice two notable
innovations which have been widely copied-judicial review by Execu-
tive Reference prior to promulgation and the "popular" 80 or public
action to declare the unconstitutionality of statutes. I shall not give
it the space it deserves since the field has been ably covered by J. A. C.
Grant in a series of noteworthy articles."'
The earlier constitutions with one exception already noted did
not provide any form of judicial review. Under the federal system
(beginning in 1853, reaching an extreme with the 1863 constitution
and expiring with a revolution in 1885), the Senate was vested with
the power to declare void acts of the states in violation of the national
constitution. Nullification by a majority of the states of unconsti-
tutional acts of Congress was authorized. The Supreme Court had
only a limited power of suspension until the Senate acted. The
Senate's numerous decisions were often marred by strong political
bias, almost inevitable when such a matter is left to a political body.
70 Urrejola, Jan. 4, 1933; 30 Rev. D. 1-176.
77 Rodriguez, June 8, 1933; 30 Rev. D. 1-399.
78 L6pez v. Cia. Nacional de Tel6fonos, 26 Nov. 1931; 29 Rev. D. 1-194 (1932).
Colombian cases are in accord.
7 Caro, Miguel Antonio: Estudios Constitucionales. Bogotfi, 1951; Constain:
Elementos de Derecho Constitucional, 2d ed. Bogota, 1951; Gibson: The Constitutions
of Colombia 1948; Perez, Francisco de P.: Derecho Constitucional Colombiano. 3d. ed.
2 v. Bogoti 1952; Pombo, Manuel Antonio y Jose Joaquin Guerra: Constituciones de
Colombia, 4 v. Bogoti, 1951 (1st ed. 1892); Samper, Jose Maria: Derecho Publico
Interno de Colombia. Historia Critica Del Derecho Constitutional Colombiano Desde
1810 Hasta 1886. 2d ed. 2 v. Bogoti, 1951; Tascon, Tulio Enrique: Historia del Derecho
Constitucional Colombiano. Bogoti, 1953
80 In our phraseology, a popular action is one for a statutory penalty which is
given to the person who sues for it. 1 C.J.S. "Actions" § 1 at 948 (1936).
81 "'Contract Clause' Litigation in Colombia; a comparative study in judicial
Review," 42 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1080 (1948); "New Jersey's 'Popular Action' in Rem
to Control Legislative Procedure," 4 Rutgers L. Rev. 391-417 (1948-9); "Judicial Re-
view by Executive Reference Prior to Promulgation-the Colombian Experience," 21
So. Cal. L. Rev. 154-171 (1948); "Judicial Control in Colombia," 23 So. Cal. L. Rev.
484-504 (1950); "Judicial Control of Legislation," 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 186-198 (1954);
and other articles of his cited in these. See also Eder, Advisory Opinions and Declara-
tory Judgments with Respect to Constitutional Questions. Sixth Conf. Inter-Am. Bar
Ass'n, Detroit, 1949 (also in Spanish).
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The 1886 constitution (art. 90) provides that if the President
vetoes a bill on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and Congress
insists on the measure, it shall be remitted to the Supreme Court for
its opinion as to constitutionality. The Supreme Court must render
its opinion within six days. If the Court upholds constitutionality,
the President is obligated to sign and promulgate the law; if it
decides adversely, the bill is tabled.
The term of six days is obviously very short for a full discussion,
but the court has held that the time does not begin to run until the
Attorney General's opinion has been filed. Even so the term is short,
especially since the court has ruled that when it has once rendered
an opinion that the bill is constitutional, no one can later raise the
question that the law has violated his constitutional rights.
Such a decision, then, is not an advisory opinion in the North
American sense of the term but goes much further. Under our few
state constitutions which provide for them, 2 advisory opinions are
advisory in the strict sense, that is, they are not authoritative judg-
ments. In performing this function, the judges act not as a court but
as the constitutional advisers of the other branches of the govern-
ment. The opinions rendered do not have the force of a judicial
decision. Unlike Colombia, there can be no question that the matter
can be thrashed out de novo in the courts by any person who claims
that his constitutional rights have been invaded by a law as to which
an advisory opinion has been given."3
Advisory opinions, whether decisive or not, are surely not an
answer to the problem. The procedure was often used in Colombia,
but after the introduction of the popular action, it gradually fell
into disuse.
The 1886 constitution (still in force) did not originally provide
for any other form of judicial review. To allay fears, the Bill of Rights
was incorporated in the Civil Code, but this was rendered nugatory
by the precept that a later law takes precedence over an earlier one
and by Law 153 of 1887 (art. 6) which declared that "an express
provision of a law subsequent to the constitution is to be deemed con-
stitutional and is to be applied even though it appears to be contrary
to the Constitution." Result: a flood of unconstitutional statutes.
In 1910, after nearly three decades of virtual dictatorship, a
constitutional amendment of transcendental importance was enacted.
Article 41 of amendment No. 3 of 1910 (now article 214) provides:
82 Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South
Dakota.
83 17 C.J. § 150 at 445 et seq.; 21 C.J.S. "Courts" § 190 at 316 (1940) ; 1 Thayer,
Cases on Constitutional Law, 156, 175-176 (1895); 2 Tunc Nos. 230, 244, pp. 237,
263, 264.
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To the Supreme Court of Justice is entrusted the guardian-
ship of the integrity of the Constitution. Consequently, in ad-
dition to the powers conferred upon it herein and by the laws,
it shall have the following:
To decide definitively as to the enforceability (exequibilidad)
of Legislative Acts which have been vetoed by the Government or
as to the laws and decrees challenged before it by any citizen as
unconstitutional, after hearing the Attorney General of the Nation.
Constitutional questions may be raised in the course of ordinary
litigation (art. 215) in all courts but this method is rarely used in
view of the public action.
Grant traces the popular action to the experience in Colombia
itself in connection with local government. The popular action has
deep roots in Spanish and Spanish American law, dating from Roman
law, reproduced in the Siete Partidas. Instances of it are to be found
in many texts. 4
In Colombia, several hundred petitions to declare unconsti-
tutionality by the popular action, have been filed and about a fourth
of them have been successful. Statutes have been invalidated because
they disturbed rights vested under contracts or under prior laws,
interfered with freedom of contract or with freedom of speech, took
private property for public use without adequate compensation, ap-
propriated money for other than a proper governmental purpose, or
granted special privileges in defiance of the principle of equality be-
fore the law.8"
A few recent cases may be noted. A statute vesting the Ministry
of Justice with judicial functions in labor disputes was held invalid,8 6
and also one prohibiting teaching of dentistry, pharmacy and allied
84 Cadiz Constitution of 1812, art. 373, followed in many of the early Spanish
American constitutions. In the early constitution of Buenos Aires and in Peru nearly
all the constitutions, beginning with that of 1823 (art. 109) provided for a popular
action against judges guilty of misfeasance (criticized by Colmeiro, Derecho Constitu-
cional de las Republicas Hispano-Americanas, 366-370 (Madrid, 1858)). Venezuelan
Constitution of 1858 (art. 118(8)), initiating judicial review. Article 20 of the Costa
Rican Constitution of 1871. judiciary Law of Ecuador (1922, art. 5), popular action
to challenge the qualifications of judges.
85 Full citations in Grant, "Judicial Control in Colombia," supra note 81. Pirez
regrets that the Supreme Court has not used to its full extent the powers conferred
on it, having introduced unwarranted distinctions and exceptions, op. cit. supra note 79,
vol. 2, 290-295. The court rejects the doctrine of implied or inherent power in the court
and bases its view on strict interpretation of its authority. Judgments of Feb. 15, 1915;
23 G.j. 253; May 26, 1931, G.J. 413. Power to pass on the constitutionality of decrees
of the Government formerly vested in the Supreme Court was withdrawn, in part, from
its jurisdiction and assigned to the Council of State, the highest administrative court, by
Amendment No. 1 of 1945. For the Council of State, see Gibson, "The Colombian Coun-
cil of State," 5 J. Politics 291 (1943).
86 Montoya Mejia, Sept. 10, 1958; 89 G.J. 3.
1960]
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professions except in universities and institutions recognized by the
State, as an infringement on the freedom (subject to inspection) of
teaching.87 A decision that has aroused lively interest holds that
confiscation of enemy alien property is unconstitutional.88
The popular action is believed by Colombian writers to be
superior to the American system in that it does not depend upon the
chance occurrence of adventitious litigation. In practical effect, it is
not unlike our declaratory action. The system has the advantage of
avoiding long delays in settling a controverted constitutional point.
It also permits challenge of statutes dealing with purely administrative
matters not likely to become the subject of private litigation and thus
integrates the duty of the Supreme Court to act as guardian of the
whole constitution and not merely of the Bill of Rights. s9 These
advantages, as a practical matter, probably outweigh the defects of
the system, some of which could be remedied by procedural changes.
The chief defect however, lies in the nature of the proceeding itself.
The court passes upon what is really a moot or academic question,
rather than an actual controversy. No ox is gored. This is in striking
contrast to the declaratory action procedure in the United States and
the British Commonwealth, which the courts will not entertain unless
there is a real controversy.
Analogous provisions as to judicial review before promulgation,
arising from a veto on the ground of unconstitutionality, are to be
found in the Ecuadorean Constitution of 1869 (art. 43) and later
ones. The Colombian formula was copied by several countries, with
minor modifications. Panama's first constitution (1904) adopted it.
In its present form (constitution of 1946, arts. 131, 167) the power
includes not only bills, but also constitutional amendments objected
to by the PresidentO0
In Venezuela under the 1945 (arts. 89, 90, 91) and 1953 (art.
90) constitutions, the bill is submitted to the Federal Court for de-
finitive decision. The provision is contained in the 1939 and 1950
(art. 52) Constitutions of El Salvador, Honduras 1936 (art. 108);
Nicaragua 1939 (art. 257(17)), 1950 (art. 229(17)). The Consti-
tution of Costa Rica (1949, art. 128) contains a similar provision;
a two-thirds vote of all the members of the court is required to de-
clare the bill unconstitutional.91
87 Isaza Moreno, Sept. 12, 1958; 89 G.J. 8.
88 Eder, 54 Am. J. of Int'l. L. 159 (1960).
89 This is stressed by Tena in connection with the Mexican anmparo, defective in
this regard.
O0 1 Goytia, Bases y Doctrinas de Derecho Publico, 33, 34 (1948). In Colombia
the veto on constitutional grounds does not extend to amendments to the constitution.
2 Perez, 76-79.
91 In the Cuban Constitution of 1940 (arts. 22, 23) there is a special case. Socialist
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True advisory opinions are authorized to be given by the Supreme
Court in the cases determined by the constitution and laws (Nica-
ragua, 1893, art. 92; 1939, arts. 200, 256(20); 1950 art. 179); and
Costa Rica (1949, art. 167) requires the legislature to seek the opinion
of the Supreme Court as to all bills concerning the organization or
functioning of the Judicial Power. To reject the opinion of the court,
a two-thirds vote of the full membership of the Legislature is required.
In Honduras (1906, art. 79) advisory opinions in regard to bills
affecting the administration of justice were authorized and in the
present constitution (1957, art. 246) on constitutionality in case
of veto.
The popular action was adopted in Ecuador in 1929 (never
effective), Haiti in the same year, by Cuba in 1934, by Panama in
1941, and by El Salvador in 1950. It had been incorporated in the
1858 Constitution of Venezuela as to state legislation.
In Brazil:
Any citizen shall be a legitimate party to plead the annul-
ment or declaration of nullity of acts injurious to the patrimony
of the Union, of the States, of the Municipalities or autarchic
entities and of corporations of mixed economy.9 2 (art. 141(38)).
Paulino Jacques calls this a "right of popular action."93 It seems
substantially similar to our taxpayer's action. Taxpayers in most of
our states, are held to have a sufficient interest to maintain a suit
to enjoin action by state or municipal officers under an invalid law
which will affect the property of the state or political subdivision, or
the amount of taxes to be paid.
As to Peru's "popular action," see infra.
Costa Rica95
Costa Rica stands apart from other Central American countries,
with a largely white population, a high literacy rate, a relatively
tendencies in the constitutional convention succeeded in restricting the former principle
of the invalidity of retroactive laws affecting vested rights. Retroactive laws are per-
mitted provided that they are passed by a two-thirds vote of the total membership of
both chambers and are approved by the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees (the
Supreme Court) if the "Social utility or national necessity" motivating the bill in
question is challenged.
92 I.e., in which the State is a participant.
93 Curso de Direito Constitucional, 25. Rio (1956).
94 43 C.J.S. "Injunctions" § 119 at 654, n.63 (1945); Id, § 108, p. 619; 64 C.J.S.
§§ 2156-2172, pp. 982-1012.
95 Zeledon, Marco Tulio: (1) Digesto Constitucional de Costa Rica. San Jos6, 1946
(a compilation of the constitutions with historical introduction). (2) El Recurso de
Inconstitucionalidad. San Josh, 1948 (reprint from 3 Revista del Colegio de Abogados
No. 25, Jan. 1948).
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peaceful history and a record of democracy, not dictatorship. The
rule of law has been predominant.
The 1871 constitution repeating substantially earlier formulas,
declared "the provisions of the Legislative or Executive Power which
are contrary to the Constitution are null and of no effect, whatsoever
be the form in which they are issued." An amendment introduced
the vital addition: "The courts of justice shall not obey or apply
them in any case." This power was exercised occasionally. 6
The lower courts no longer have the power to declare unconsti-
tutionality. The 1949 amendments to the constitution vest such power
exclusively in the Supreme Court and require a two-thirds vote of
the whole court for such action. s
7
Cuba
Cuba's independence was due to the United States, a fact that
present-day vociferators choose to forget. The United States Military
Government introduced many changes in the law; some of its enact-
ments are still in force. Many of the revolutionary leaders had lived
in the United States. In the constitution of 1901, naturally based
in large part on that of the United States, judicial review by the
Supreme Tribunal was adopted as a matter of course (art. 83), on
our pattern that the issue of constitutionality could be raised only in a
litigated case by an injured party.
The implementation of the provision for judicial review was left
to the legislature, which enacted a law on May 31, 1903. Every
controversy between parties as to the constitutionality of a law, decree
or regulation was to be determined exclusively by the Supreme Tri-
bunal of Justice. If a constitutional issue were raised before any civil,
criminal or administrative judge or court, no decision on the particular
96 Judiciary Law (1887) art. 8. Haines, 611-618 quotes from a few cases. Twenty
cases between 1938 and 1948 are narrated in Zeledon (2) op. cit. supra note 95 at 26-
35, 39. In only three (against executive decrees) was unconstitutionality declared, al-
though in several, a majority (but not the requisite two-thirds) considered the laws
or decrees in question to be unconstitutional. This creates an unfortunate situation.
The requirement of a special majority seems to be unwise. Several state constitutions
have special requirements for a declaration of unconstitutionality-Colorado, Ohio,
South Carolina, Virginia.
97 The exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court had already been declared by
statute as also the requirement of a 2/3 vote (Judiciary Law, art. 8; Code of Civil
Procedure, arts. 962-969). Zeledon, op. cit. supra note 95, considers this legislation to
have been unconstitutional, 36 et seq. Only an injured party can raise the question.
Marshall Jimenez v. El Estado, June 7, 1947, Sentencias de la Corte de Casaci6n 1947,
415 (voiding a presidential decree cancelling Costa Rican citizenship and confiscating
property of Nazis). And see Steinvorth v. El Estado, Aug. 30, 1948, Sentencias 1948,
569.
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point was to be made, but the judgment was to state that fact and the
parties could thereupon file an appeal of cassation. The Supreme
Tribunal on deciding the appeal would determine the constitutional
question. Any person against whom a law deemed by him to be
unconstitutional, was applied outside of judicial proceedings, had the
right (but only within five days) to serve written notice on the
authority so applying it of his intention to resort to the Supreme
Tribunal. The five day limitation often proved a stumbling block.
At times, when freedom reigned, the court exercised the right
freely. In a short period (1930-1932), the Supreme Tribunal declared
35 unconstitutionalities, among others, a decree prohibiting public
meetings; a restrictive article of the Habeas Corpus Act of the United
States Military Government; restrictions on freedom of the press; and
a part of the military law that subjected civilians to military juris-
diction. In nearly 40 years, to June, 1942, 86 laws and decrees had
been declared unconstitutional."
The 1934 constitution copied the Colombian popular action, but
required the petition to be made by 25 citizens. The public action
was carried forward in the 1940 constitution, but in an extremely
complicated system. When the Supreme Tribunal sits as the Tribunal
of Constitutional Guarantees, the presence of at least 14 judges is
required. The present Organic Law is No. 7 of May 31, 1949. Within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as a constitutional court of guarantees
are, inter alia, the popular or public action of unconstitutionality;
issues in private actions by an aggrieved party; consultations by in-
ferior courts; the recourse for abuse of power by officials; and habeas
corpus. (Const. 1940, arts. 172, 174, 182, 183, 194, 195).
The provisions of the constitution and of the statute as to the
direct public action before the Supreme Tribunal, brought by a sole
citizen, a potentially aggrieved party, leave considerable room for
doubt as to the exact situation; conflicting decisions and dissenting
opinions have been frequent. The five day limitation is still in force.
In the case of the public action by 25 citizens, there is no such
limitation.
A constitutional issue can be raised in ordinary litigation in a
court, either by appeal (cassation), as under the 1901 constitution,
or by the remedy of unconstitutionality. The lower court does not
pass on the issue, but remits it to the Supreme Tribunal in con-
sultation, at the instance of a party, or on the judge's own motion.
08 Garceran, 148-151; Infiesta, 255; De Montagu, 19 Repertorio Judicial, Jan. 1943,
3-10.
99 Infiesta 106-110; Garceran, 244-345.
1960]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Or the issue may be brought directly before the Supreme Tribunal by
a popular action brought by an aggrieved party.
Castro's constitution is a typical instance of a Spanish American
tendency to give a color of legality to acts of dictatorship. The Fun-
damental Law of the Republic was promulgated on February 7, 1959
by the President and Council of Ministers. It incorporates many of
the provisions of the 1940 constitution, including with slight variations
(arts. 172, 173), those as to judicial review in that constitution (arts.
194, 195). The transitory provisions suspend guarantees, including
habeas corpus, as to Batista's partisans, suspend the right to claim
unconstitutionality and the judges' irremovability. The final article
of The Agrarian Reform Law of May 17, 1959 declares "this law to
be an integral part of the Fundamental Law of the Republic; con-
sequently this law is given constitutional force and hierarchy."
The reaction against dictators can be violent and bloody. A nice
regard for constitutional proprieties or for the "rule of law" is not a
characteristic of bloodthirsty revolutionists.
Dominican Republic et. al.
I omit reference to the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua and Paraguay, since judicial review has not taken root,
although provided for in the constitutions. The 1947 constitution of
the Dominican Republic, true to the dictatorial, totalitarian system
prevalent in the land, abolished judicial review. 00
Ecuador'0
The early constitutions of Ecuador were silent as to the consti-
tutionality of statutes. The 1845 constitution and that of 1851 (art.
100 Dominican Republic: Miranda 203, 204. It is reported that the present dictator
assures the independence of the judiciary by receiving the undated resignations of the
judges at the time of their appointment. Honduras 1894, arts. 125, 128; 1936, arts. 141,
145; 1957, arts. 232, 236-239; Stokes, Honduras an Area Study in Government, 106
et. seq.; 137-147 (bibliog. 333-340); Coello, Augusto C., El Digesto Constitucional de
Honduras (1824-1921). Tegucigalpa, 1923. Nicaragua 1893, arts. 106, 117; i939, arts.
261, 345, 346 (unchanged in 1950 constitution); Hernandez Somoza, J.: Curso de
Derecho Constitucional Nicaraguense. Managua, 1899; Alvarez, Emilio, Ensayo Historico
Sobre el Derecho Constitucional Nicaraguense. Managua, 1936. Paraguay 1940, arts. 87,
91; Jaffin, "New World Constitutional Harmony," 42 Col. L. Rev. 523, 570 (1942). It
has been the view of Santo Domingo authorities that an unconstitutional statute was to
be held void by the courts whether or not there be an express right of review granted
in the constitution. MEJIA Ricart, Gustavo Adolfo: Historia del Derecho Dominicano,
236 (Santiago, Rep. Dom. 1943). Haiti: Justin: De l'Organisation Judiciaire en Haiti,
Havre 1910; Dodd, 303.
101 Borja y Borja, Ramiro: Derecho Constitucional Ecuatoriano. 2 v. and appendix.
Madrid, 1950. Noboa, Aurelio: Recopilacion de Leyes del Ecuador, t. 1. Constituciones.
Quito, 1898.
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35) declare that no law in conflict with the constitution shall have
effect. Intermediate constitutions were silent. The 1897 charter
(art. 132) and later ones provide that the constitution is the supreme
law of the land (1906, art. 6; 1929, art. 61; 1945, art. 163; and 1946,
art. 189). This provision is meaningless from the standpoint of
judicial control, in view of the exclusive power of Congress to decide
as to constitutionality (supra).1°2 Under the present constitution
(1946), the Supreme Court is vested with the power to examine and
decide provisionally whether a statute complies with "formal" re-
quisites (i.e. as to enactment), but the ultimate decision lies with
Congress. Similarly, the Council of State can pass provisionally on
Presidential decrees, the definitive decision against resting with
Congress.1 °3
El Salvador 4"
The 1886 constitution (art. 110) gave the courts jurisdiction,
within their power of administering justice, to declare the inap-
plicability of any law or provision of other branches, contrary to
constitutional precepts, in cases in which they may have to pronounce
judgment. This is repeated in the 1950 constitution (art. 95).
Very few cases on constitutionality are reported. A decision of
1904 as to leases was held constitutional. The right of the General
Assembly to grant amnesty, even for common crimes, was upheld.
The court will not pass judgment on the legal bases the Executive
has to decree expropriation, but a decree of expropriation of property
for a private, not a public, road was held unconstitutional." 5
The 1950 constitution (art. 96) introduced the Colombian
popular action, viz:
The Supreme Court of Justice shall be the sole tribunal
competent to declare the unconstitutionality of laws, decrees and
regulations, both as to form and content, in a general and obligatory
manner and may do so upon the petition of any citizen.
The inclusion of "form" was presumably in order to expressly
reject the doctrine laid down by the Colombian Supreme Court that
it will not declare a statute unconstitutional for defects of external
102 Prior to 1898, there had been eleven laws "interpreting" the constitution.
103 1 Borja, op. cit. supra note 101 at 646-652. He severely criticizes the Ecuadorean
system, 656-658.
104 Aguirre Cardona, La Historia Constitucional de el Salvador. Talca (Chile)
1954 (thesis). Colindres, Jurisprudencia Salvadorena 2 v. Santiago de Maria, 1915.
Gallardo, Miguel Angel, Cuatro Constituciones Federales de Centro America y Las
Constituciones Politicas de el Salvador. San Salvador, 1945. Goches Castro, Angel,
Indice de la Jurisprudencia Salvadorena 1901-1902. Santa Ana 1935. Menendez, Isidro
(comp.), Recopilacion de Las Leyes del Salvador. 2 ed. San Salvador 1956.
105 Colindres, Id., vol. 1, 31, 63, 121; vol. 2, 397.
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form, i.e., for failure to comply with the requirements as to enactment,
etc. o6
Guatemala°7
The 1921 amendments to the constitution amended article 93
to read:
Within the power of administering justice, it corresponds
to the Judicial Power to declare the inapplication of any law or
provision of the other Powers, when contrary to the precepts con-
tained in the Constitution; but it can make use of this faculty only
in the judgments it pronounces..' 8
The 1927 amendments to the then constitution provided a
remedy by amparo (see infra) and amended article 85 to read:
It corresponds to the Supreme Court of Justice to declare on
pronouncing judgment, that a law, whatsoever be its form is not
applicable because contrary to the Constitution. It also corresponds
to the tribunals of second instance and to judges of record (jueces
letrados) who have cognizance in first instance, to declare the
inapplication of any law or provision of other Powers when con-
trary to the precepts contained in the Constitution of the Republic.
The said inapplication can only be declared by the courts referred
to, in concrete cases, and in the resolutions they pronounce.
The 1945 constitution retained these provisions. It also de-
clared (art. 50):
Statutory, governmental or other provisions which regulate
the exercise of the rights which this Constitution guarantees are
null ipso jure, if they diminish, restrict or tergiversate them.'09
This was repeated in article 73 of the 1956 constitution which also
provides (art. 187):
In every action and appeal, the interested parties may peti-
tion for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the law therein
involved.
This constitution was promulgated under Castillo Armas two
years after the military defeat of the Arbenz communist regime. It
outlawed the Communist Party and any other totalitarian system
106 The "enrolled bill" doctrine praised by Grant, "New Jersey's Popular Action,"
4 Rutgers L. Rev. 391 (1948-9); Criticized by 1 Perez, op. cit. supra note 79 at 290.
107 Echeverria S., Buenaventura, Derecho Constitucional Guatamalteco Guatemala
1944. Silvert, K. H., A Study in Government. Guatemala (1954) 45, 47 (bibliog. 95,
96). Rocz Bennett, Jose, Digesto Constitucional de Guatemala, 1949 (reprinted from
7 Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Juridicas y Sociales Nos. 2, 3 and 4.
108 The Judiciary Law of 1889 had provided that the court cannot under any
pretext suspend compliance with statutes and regulations.
109 An "ambiguous and perilous" provision. Miranda, op. cit. supra note 100 at
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(art. 23). Among the transitory articles it provided (No. 7) that
expropriations and adjudications made by the Provisional Govern-
ment Junta could not be challenged as unconstitutional. It provided
(art. 75) for a public action for the prosecution of violations of the
principles of the Bill of Rights; such action may be brought by a
simple denunciation without bond and without formality of any kind
(repeated from art. 50, 1945 constitution).
To judge by the reports of the last few years, amparo has proven
an ineffectual arm to protect individual rights or to maintain the
legislature and executive within constitutional limits. Grant narrates
a case in which confiscation of the property of the ex-dictator Ubico
was held unconstitutional."' Arbenz and his followers did not fare
so well. Neither did Nottebohm, of international fame."'
Mexico and the Amparo"2
The constitutionality of legislation is tested in Mexico by the
suit of amparo, as typically and natively Mexican as pulque and the
tortilla. Its inspiration was probably derived from the writ of habeas
corpus, although some extreme nationalists or hispanicists have
essayed other origins. The Mexican founding fathers asked them-
selves: Why should not the blessings of habeas corpus be extended to
all of the constitutional freedoms? Accordingly, first in the consti-
tution of 1847 and more fully in the immortal constitution of 1857,
provision was made for the amparo. A long civil war and the French
invasion prevented use. Then followed the decades of the dictatorship
of Porfirio Diaz. Nevertheless, there sprang up under him the golden
age of Mexican jurisprudence and with Vallarta (Mexico's John
Marshall) as President of the Supreme Court amparo was moulded
and took on substantial proportions." 3 Emilio Rabasa's writings con-
tributed to the development of the amparo in the constitution of 1917.
Both men admired the United States constitutional system and Val-
larta's decisions were modeled on American theories." 4
110 "Due process of ex-dictators; a study of judicial control of legislation in
Guatemala," 41 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 463-469 (1947). But see Samayoa Bonifaz v. Ubico,
S.C. May 19, 1950, 70 Gaceta de los Tribunales 60, in which by virtue of later decrees
expressly retroactive, the defense of unconstitutionality was rejected.
111 Nottebohm, S.C. Oct. 17, 1951; 71 Gaceta 146; Peralta v. President of the
Republic, 80 Gaceta (1958) 98.
112 Tena Ramirez: Leon Orantes: Burgoa: Clagett, "The Mexican Suit of Amparo,"
33 Geo. L. J. 418-437 (1945). Fix Zamudio, "El Amparo contra leyes," 13 Boletin del
Instituto de Derecho Comparado de Mexico, No. 37, En-Abr. 1960, 11-40.
113 Vallarta, Ignacio: El Juicio de Amparo y el Writ of Habeas Corpus 1881; 2 ed.
1896 (a classical work): Cuestiones Constitucionales 4 v. 1878-1883.
114 Tena 4th ed., op. cit. supra note 112 at 80-84, thinks that at least today, even
though the texts may be analogous, American cases and doctrine are of little service
to interpret the Mexican constitution. Other judges and lawyers disagree.
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The original purpose of amparo was to provide a remedy in
court to an injured individual against an attack by an act of a public
authority against his lawful rights or interests guaranteed by the con-
stitution. By what some deemed to be a deviation from the original
purpose, but finding a basis in articles 14 and 16 of the 1857 consti-
tution (substantially the same in the 1917 charter), the Supreme
Court and authoritative commentators upheld the view that amparo
should afford protection against illegal acts,115 and that any failure
by a court or by an administrative authority to "exactly," i.e., cor-
rectly apply a code or other statute was a violation of a constitutional
right. Hence amparo, though technically a separate action, has in
effect become the ordinary and usual means of appeal. With this
aspect of amparo, we are not here concerned, although it is of far
greater interest and importance to the ordinary man and lawyer than
the power to declare the unconstitutionality of statutes.
The chief characteristics of amparo may be summed up thusly:
(1.) It is directed solely against an act of a public authority (legislative,
administrative, executive or judicial)-there is no possibility of a
constitutional issue being raised in private litigation; (2.) Proof is
required of a direct and personal injury (it need not be financial);
(3.) The decision applies only to the particular case, a general decla-
ration in respect of the law or act being prohibited. The suspension,
very like our interlocutory injunction, authorized by the constitution
and the procedural law, is of major importance. It may be decreed
ex officio by the judge in case irreparable damage is threatened, or
upon petition of the plaintiff, furnishing a bond. A counter bond may
be given. If the plaintiff is successful, a final suspension is decreed.
There is no equivalent of mandamus. Suspension cannot be had when
the act against which the claim is made is a negative act-a refusal
or omission by the responsible authority to do something.
When dealing with acts which affect personal liberty there is a
strong resemblance to several aspects of habeas corpus.
Amparo is available only in the federal courts and only the
federal courts have jurisdiction to declare the unconstitutionality of
statutes. It is held that state judges, like administrative officials, have
to apply the statute notwithstanding that article 133 of the consti-
tution imposes on them the obligation to prefer the constitution over
their own state laws.
The complaint must set forth, inter alia, the act against which
the action is brought, the precepts of the constitution deemed violated
and the manner in which the violation occurs. The action calls for
a return or report by the defendant authority, and then a hearing
115 Illegality (ilegalidad) generally means contrary to a statutory precept.
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(analogous to a trial, in which evidence is offered) is had. The
statute calls for the hearing within 30 days, but in practice it is de-
layed for many months or a year.
Under the earlier decisions, amparo did not lie against a statute
but only against its application. Later it was held that a self-executing
statute could be directly attacked-one that makes illegal what was
previously legal or one that changes legal status. Decisions of the
Supreme Court have not been consistent as to what constitutes self-
executing legislation. The controversy has lost much of its importance
since the 1950 amendments. Amparo can now be brought against an
unconstitutional law either within 30 days of its promulgation or
within 15 days of its first application. In case of direct attack on a
statute, the defendant is the Congress.
The first Organic Law of Amparo was in 1861. The present law,
with amendments, is that of 1936. The 1917 constitution includes as
a safeguard many procedural requirements that might have been left
to the statute. The procedural statutes have become progressively
more complicated; more and more instances have been added as to
when amparo does not lie. It ill befits a New York practitioner to
complain of the intricacies of procedure elsewhere, but it does seem
to me that unnecessary complications, in contrast to the original
simple procedure, have grown up.
A great many state and federal laws have been declared unconsti-
tutional in whole or in part.
Amparo does not lie against violations of a contract by a govern-
ment organ, save in exceptional cases (they are not "acts of au-
thority," a requisite for the action), against violation of political,
e.g. electoral, rights (these are not "individual guarantees"), against
extradition, nor against expulsion by the President of "pernicious
foreigners."
Mexican writers are justly proud of the amparo, but a few of
them tend to exaggerate its virtues, vaunting its superiority over other
systems. Their enthusiastic eulogiums are set off by the defects they
themselves point out. The majority of writers are more judicious.
Oil company lawyers may be pardoned for being skeptical. It
was held that suspension or amparo did not lie against the decrees
of expropriation, because the general interest was involved, or against
the oil legislation since oil is one of the principal sources of public
wealth and the damage to society and the State, if the legislation were
suspended, would be patent."' In general, amparo does not lie against
expropriations for "social benefit." Expropriation of the oil companies
was unanimously acclaimed by public opinion and is still considered
116 Leon Orantes, op. cit. supra note 112 at 376-381.
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a landmark to be celebrated annually. We may well bear in mind Mr.
Dooley's saying that our Supreme Court follows the election returns.
One defect is that the courts are overburdened with amparo
cases. At the end of November, 1950, there were 37,891 amparo
cases pending before the Supreme Court. To relieve the pressure five
circuit courts were organized. The pressure has been relieved, but
Burgoa and others think the new system has on the whole done as
much harm as good.
As of November 30, 1959, there was still a backlog of 9,264
amparo cases in the Supreme Court. The great defect of amparo
(resulting in this burden) seems to be what was hailed as its virtue,
namely, that the decision is binding only in the concrete case. Except
as to that particular case, the executive authorities are not bound by
the doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court. 17
Amparo has been adopted by all the Central American countries.
Nowhere does it seem to have been as effective as in Mexico.
Amparo was introduced in the constitutions (and continued in
later ones) in Guatemala in 1879, El Salvador in 1886,118 Honduras
in 1894,119 The Central American Federation in 1898, and 1921, in
Nicaragua in 1911,10 Panama, in a limited form, in 1941,121 and
Costa Rica in 1949.122
In general, the Mexican system is followed, but judicial decisions
are excluded. In El Salvador, differing from the Mexican rule, it
lies against individuals also. In that country most of the amparo
proceedings have been to protect property rights and against arbitrary
acts of the mayors (alcaldes). A few have been tax cases.
In Guatemala, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction.
Under the new constitution of 1956, it held that until a new im-
plementing statute was enacted, it would not pass in amparo proceed-
117 Informe rendido a la Corte Suprema de Justicia por su Presidente afio de 1959;
Segunda Sala p. 6.
118 Arts. 37, 102; 1939, art. 57; 1950, arts. 89(1), 222. Decree No. 7 of Oct. 4,
1950, a brief statute of 26 articles in contrast with the lengthy Mexican statute, amended
the 1886 law. The judiciary Law (Decree 1136 of Sept. 3, 1952) includes among the
attributes of the Supreme Court final decision of amparo suits.
119 Art. 29; 1906, art. 28; and the Constitutional Law of Amparo of the same
year; constitution of 1924, arts. 29, 135; 1936, art. 33; 1957, arts. 67, 232(7). A "consti-
tutional law" in Latin America is one that implements a provision of the constitution
and that requires special procedure or a special majority for amendment, in contrast
to ordinary laws.
120 Arts. 63, 124; 1939, arts. 119, 256(11); 1950, arts. 229, 323; the Constitutional
Law of Amparo was published in La Gaceta No. 27 of Feb. 8, 1951.
121 Art. 189; Moscote, El Derecho Constitucional Panameno, 464 seq. (1943); 1946,
art. 51.
122 Art. 48.
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ings on the constitutionality of legislation. =3 In 1956, there were
eleven amparo petitions; all were denied. In 1957, of about forty pe-
titions, all were denied except three, illegal arrest of prostitutes and
denials of passports to non-communists leaving the country after
March 1, 1956.14
Of far greater importance and interest, however, than the Central
American precedents are the recent developments in the Argentine
Republic. Several of the later provincial constitutions include a
limited form of amparo analogous to our writ of prohibition and others
utilize habeas corpus to protect all individual liberties and rights. 5
In two cases, Siri2 6 and Kot,27 the Supreme Court granted am-
paro, expressly overruling prior decisions. Siri's newspaper had been
closed down, without any order of a competent authority and without
statement of a justified motive. This the court held was a violation of
the constitutional freedoms of the press and of industry, and said, at
p. 463:
This direct proof is sufficient for the constitutional guarantee
invoked to be reestablished in its full integrity by the judges,
and it is of no avail to allege contrary thereto the non-existence of
a law which regulates it. Individual guarantees exist and protect
individuals by the sole fact of being consecrated by the Con-
stitution and independently of regulatory laws, which are required
solely to establish 'in what cases and with what justification may
entry and occupation be proceeded with' as said in article 18 of
the Constitution about one of them . . . In consideration of the
character and hierarchy of the principles of the Fundamental
Charter relating to individual rights, this Supreme Court, with its
present composition and on the first opportunity to make a pro-
nouncement on the point, departs from the doctrine traditionally
declared by the court to the extent that it relegated to the course
of ordinary procedures, administrative or judicial, the protection
of rights not strictly comprised in habeas corpus. (Bertotto Fallos,
168:15; 169:103; and later decisions). The constitutional pre-
cepts as well as the institutional experience of the country jointly
demand the full enjoyment and exercise of individual guarantees
123 Zelayo Coronado v. El Congreso de la Repdblica, Nov. 22, 1957, 80 Gaceta de
los Tribunales 100 (an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the designation by Con-
gress of a successor to the assassinated President Castilla Armas and calling for elections
for a later date than that provided by the constitution).
124 Visquez v. Procurador General, 80 Gaceta 82; Garcia Montenegro v. Ministro
de Gobernad6n, So Gaceta 88; Castaneda Paz v. Presidente de la Repdblica, 80 Gaceta
90.
125 Dana Montafio, "El Estado de Derecho." La Ley, Dec. 22, 1955 (quoting the
texts in full) and see Amadeo, 169 et. seq.
126 Siri, Dec. 27, 1957; 239 Fallos 459 (strong dissenting opinion).
127 S.R.L. Samuel Kot, Sept. 5, 1958; 241 Fallos 291 (with dissenting opinions).
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for the effective vigor of the State of Law128 and impose the duty
on the Judges to assure them . ..The record is returned to the
court below to serve notice on the police authorities to desist from
the restrictions, etc.
In the Kot case, the order of amparo was directed not against a
public officer, but against private individuals, in a labor conflict, to
prevent irreparable damage. In this it differs markedly from the
Mexican amparo.
Few cases have given rise to such discussion in the law
journals. 2 9
Innumerable applications to the courts for amparo have resulted
from these decisions. The apparent tendency of the Supreme Court
to restrict the scope of amparo,130 is probably influenced by the desire
not to burden the courts unduly. Whether they have had in mind
the experience of Brazil and Mexico, I cannot guess.
The chief controversy seems to be between those who believe
the courts have inherent equitable powers or must look to statutory
implementation of constitutional provisions before they can act. In
many Latin American countries, as is evident throughout the course
of this paper, the latter view prevails.
panaMnna 3i
Prior to 1941, there was no effective remedy against unconsti-
tutional laws. The Supreme Court in 1935 said:132
There is not ascribed to this Court, and naturally not to the
lower court, expressly or impliedly, the attribute of deciding with
the character of generality, whether a law .. .is constitutional or
not. The direct action to obtain from the judicial power a declara-
tion of general obligatory effects in respect of whether a law or
legal disposition is contrary to the Constitution and therefore with-
out force to compel its performance does not exist in Panama.
Neither the Constitution nor the statutes enacted in development
of its principles, furnish any authority for so doing ... judicial
authorities lack any faculty to deny compliance with a statute or
128 Latin American jurists do not speak of the "Rule of Law," but of the State
of Law, derived from the German concept of Rechtsstaat.
129 E.g. Fiorini: "El Recurso de Amparo," La Ley, Mar. 31, 1959; Bielsa: "'Los
recursos judiciales," La Ley, May 21, 1959; Torres: "Amparo," La Ley, Aug. 12, 1959;
all with copious references to other works and articles.
130 E.g. Gallardo, Dec. 10, 1958; 242 Fallos 434; Buosi, June 18, 1959, La Ley
Dec. 30, 1959, 2 (will not lie to protect lessee against landlord shutting off his water
supply) and cases therein cited.
131 Goytia, Victor F.: Bases y Doctrina de Derecho Publico, 2 v. Panama 1948.
Moscote: El Derecho Constitucional Panameno. Panama, 1943.
132 National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. The Nation, quoted in Moscote, op. cit.
supra note 121 at 457, n. 10.
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to authorize non-compliance, vitiating it as unconstitutional if its
precepts are not clearly repugnant to the rules of the fundamental
charter. This is so because otherwise the courts of justice would
become censors of the activities of the Assembly and of the Execu-
tive Power in reference to the necessary formalities for the enact-
ment of statutes, a task completely extraneous to the functions
entrusted to it. To do so would be to usurp jurisdiction.
The 1941 constitution (influenced by the Cuban constitution)
contains several remedies: habeas corpus (art. 28); amparo (art.
189); the reestablishment of legality when violated by officials
(art. 190); and most important, the guardianship of the constitution
by the Supreme Court (art. 188) taken from the Colombian 1910
formula, but adding:
Every officer charged with the duty of imparting justice
who when about to decide any cause whatsoever considers that
the applicable statute or regulatory provision is unconstitutional,
shall before rendering a decision consult the Supreme Court of
Justice which shall decide whether or not the provision is constitu-
tional. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice in exercise
of the faculties conferred by this article are final and definitive and
shall be published in the Official Gazette.
This addition, Panama courts and writers believe, make it
superior to the Colombian formula. The power granted by the article,
it is said, is so general that it includes political, administrative, social
and economic matters.133
The former 1941 article is substantially embodied in articles 165
and 167 of the present constitution (1946).
A great many petitions for unconstitutionality have been success-
ful. Among others, unequal tax laws, racial discrimination, limitations
on inheritance imposed by the Civil Code, article 656 and other articles
on intestate succession, and limiting options to four years, several
articles of the Election Laws, an article of the Common Law mar-
riage statute, a law authorizing occupation of uncultivated private
lands, have been declared unconstitutional.' 3 4 Fifteen cases claiming
unconstitutionality were before the court between October 1956 and
October 1957. Constitutionality was upheld in ten cases, including
the immigration statute, Law 54 of 1938, barring the immigration of
Asiatics. In five cases, the challenged statute, decree or resolution
was held unconstitutional, including a statutory wharfage tax, on
the ground it had not been included in the budget. 5
133 Moscote, op. cit. supra note 121 at 463.
134 Goytia, op. cit. supra note 131 at 62, 63, 113, 128, 135, 176, 185, 287; 2
Anuario de Derecho, 371, 373 (1957).
135 3 Anuario de Derecho, op. cit. supra note 134 at 281-284 (1958). From 1946
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Peru1 36
Peru shares with the Dominican Republic and with Ecuador the
distinction of not recognizing judicial review. Quimper as long ago
as 1857 had advocated it and it has of recent years been proposed by
several writers,'137 including the President of the Supreme Court.13
The first professor of constitutional law in Peru (1864) was a French-
man, Pradier Fod6r6. 139
The guardianship of the constitution is left to Congress (1933,
arts. 26, 123). It is true the Civil Code 4 ° instructs judges to give
preference to the constitution over statutes, but I have found no
instance in the reports of the application of this provision. It has
been suggested that the Code contemplated future constitutional
amendment and does not authorize a declaration of unconsti-
tutionality.
The "popular action" authorized by article 133 of the consti-
tution against unconstitutional decrees of the President has not come
into use.' 4 ' The Address of the President of the Supreme Court ex-
plains why. 42
Based on this precept, three petitions were presented to the
Supreme Court in 1947 and 1948 praying that three supreme de-
crees issued by the then Executive Power be declared unconstitu-
tional . . . In all these cases the Full Court declared that the
exercise of the faculty granted to the Judicial Power by article 133
of the Constitution was not available, since the relative procedural
statute, referred to by said article, had not been enacted.
The aforesaid article of the constitution establishes expressly
and positively the authority of the Judicial Power to declare the
unconstitutionality of acts of the Executive Power and its jurisdic-
to October 1956, 235 cases claiming unconstitutionality were before the court, many
unpublished. A substantial number were successful. 2 id. 329-340 (1957).
136 Olivo, Juan F.: Constitudones Politicas del Peru 1821-1919. Lima, 1922.
Palomino Arana: Reportorio de la Jurisprudencia Peruana. Lima, 1944. Quimper, J.M.:
Derecho Politico General. Lima, 1857, vol. 2, 330, 331. Pareja Paz Soldan, Jose:
(1) Comentarios a la Constitucion Nacional. Lima 1939; (2) Las Constituciones del
Peru. Madrid 1954. Stuart: The Governmental System of Peru. Washington 1925,
Villaran, Luis F.: La Constitucion Peruana Comentada, Lima, 1899.
137 E.g. Ferrero, Raul: Derecho Constitucional (Lima, 1956) 179.
138 "La Visita del Presidente de ]a Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos." Revista
del Foro (Lima) No. Extraordinario 1954, 38 at 63, 64.
139 Several of his books were published in Lima, translated by Manuel A. Fuentes.
I surmise his influence has persisted.
140 The former Civil Code, prel. tit. art. VIII provided "The judges may not fail
to apply the laws nor render judgment except according to the provisions thereof.
141 Nor, as far as constitutionality is concerned, has the extension given to habeas
corpus by art. 69 of the constitution of 1933: "All the individual and social rights give
rise to the action of habeas corpus."
142 51 Anales Judiciales 369, 381, 382 (1955-1956). And see 52 A.J. 296-301.
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tion to take cognizance of them; the exercise of this jurisdiction is
only in suspense until a statute determines the procedure. This
shows that it is advisable for Parliament to enact the appropriate
statutory solution, so that if similar petitions are presented, the
Judicial Power will not be prevented from taking cognizance of
them.
This situation is clear and definite. But it is appropriate to
ask what is the faculty of the Judicial Power in relation to the
acts of the Legislative Power itself. Does it have power to declare
the unconstitutionality of statutes? The exercise of the attributes
of the Public Powers cannot be based on the opinion of jurists or
on doctrines abroad, abundant and contradictory, which provide
for the case, but only on positive constitutional law, the basis of
Public Internal Law and of all the rights of citizens. Therefore
the Political Constitution by means of provisions incorporated in
its articles creates and organizes them, determining their attributes
and fixing the relation and interdependence of some in respect of
others and thus avoids a conflict between them which might gravely
affect the life of the State. And in no part of our Constitution is
there any article as to the point in question.
It is for the Congress to provide the proper solution. Its
attributes and wisdom will determine whether it will grant to the Ju-
dicial Power, and in what amplitude, a function of such signifi-
cance and at the same time it will enact the procedural rules for
its exercise. And the Judicial Power, for its part, will fulfill the
mission assigned to it, with the same serenity and firmness with
which it intervenes in all the acts of its functional life.
Uruguay14
3
Twentieth Century Uruguay is distinguished by its adherence to
democracy, its innovations in constitutional law and government, and
the establishment of the first welfare state in Latin America. It was a
latecomer in adopting judicial review. The early constitutions left
the guardianship of the constitution to Congress. Whether to con-
tinue this system or adopt judicial review was the subject of debate
in the convention that prepared the 1934 constitution. A compromise
formula was arrived at in an attempt to safeguard the traditional
view of the sovereignty and supremacy of Parliament and reconcile
it with judicial control, by making a court decision applicable only to
the particular case, leaving the statute unimpaired and in full force
otherwise.
143 Borafflio, Eugenio V. & Zerbino Cavajani, Jorge: La Inconstitucionalidad de las
Leyes en ]a Jurisprudencia Nacional. Montevideo, 1941 (reprint from "La Justicia
Uruguaya" 1941); Gros Espiell, Hector: Las Constituciones del Uruguay. Madrid, 1950
(bibliog. footnotes). Macedo, case note, 55 Revista de Derecho Jurisprudencia y Ad-
ministracion 157-208 (1957) (hereinafter cited Rev. D.JA.), a full discussion of the
doctrine of judicial review. Martins, Hugo & Gros Espiell: Constitucion Uruguaya
Anotada. Montevideo, 1956 (bibliog. 335-344). Morey Otero, Sebastian: Constitucion
Anotada de Ia Republica Oriental del Uruguay. 3d ed. Montevideo, 1936.
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A residuum of the power of the Legislature was left in article 75:
It is the province of the General Assembly . . . (20) To
interpret the Constitution, without prejudice to the power of the
Supreme Court in accordance with articles 229 to 232.144
Articles 229 to 232 followed the Chilean system with some
modifications:
229. Laws may be declared unconstitutional by reason of
their form or contents, in accordance with what is established in
the following articles.
230. Said declaration and the inapplicability of the pro-
visions affected by it must be solicited by the interested party.
The judge or court that has cognizance of the case may also ex
officio raise the question of unconstitutionality before rendering a
decision.
231. After the petition is presented or the unconstitution-
ality of a law is raised ex officio in a concrete case, the suit shall
remain in abeyance and the proceedings shall be brought to the
Supreme Court of Justice, to which belong the jurisdiction and
the original and exclusive solution of the case, with the require-
ments for final judgments.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Justice shall have
effect only in the controversial case in which it is pronounced.
232. The law shall regulate the relevant procedure.
The Supreme Court held in 1936 that it could pass on consti-
tutionality without awaiting the enactment of a regulatory statute.
This was expressly enacted in a wise provision of the constitutions
of 1942 (art. 282) and of 1952 (art. 332), which could well be copied
elsewhere, viz:
The precepts of the present Constitution which recognize
individual rights as well as those that attribute faculties to or im-
pose duties on public authorities, shall not fail to be applied for
lack of the respective regulations, but such lack shall be supplied
by resort to the foundations of analogous statutes, to the general
principles of law and to generally accepted doctrines.
Under the 1934 constitution, the issue only reached the Supreme
Court by obligatory reference to it from the lower courts. The 1952
constitution (art. 258) permits a direct action for the declaration of
unconstitutionality to be brought in the Supreme Court.
The cases have dealt chiefly with alleged violations of property
rights, including the first decision in 1936 which held that an expro-
priation law of 1927 fixing a maximum price per hectare did not
meet the constitutional requirement of "fair compensation." Only the
144 And the Legislature has power to declare acts of the local provincial bodies to
be unconstitutional (Constitution 1934, art. 261; 1952, art. 303. See note 55 Rev. D.JA.
125 (1951).
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courts, in case of controversy, can finally decide the value. (A dis-
senting opinion was to the effect that the Legislature is competent
to fix the quantum). Several other cases have upheld the requirement
as to fair compensation. 145 The constitutionality of a moratorium
on debts was upheld, but a provision in the law for reduction of the
interest rates stipulated in the contracts was invalid.'46
Venezuela 4 '
Limited powers of judicial review were first given in the consti-
tution of 1858, and in full in 1893. The 1945 and 1947 constitutions
provide that the High Court shall declare the nullity of the acts of
the national and state legislatures, municipal councils, of the Execu-
tive Power of the Nation or of the states and of the Governors of
the Federal District or Federal Territories which violate the consti-
tution. This provision was substantially reenacted in the 1953 consti-
tution (art. 133), which divided the High Court into two courts: one
the Federal Court, the other the Court of Cassation.
The Organic Law of the High Court, August 22, 1945, provided
for notice to the Attorney General (art. 45) and in constitutional
cases, the full court sat, with seven sufficient to constitute a quorum,
but in no case could a decision be rendered by a majority of less than
six (art. 4). Under the Organic Law of the Federal Court, August 22,
1953, decision must be rendered by at least three votes (art. 5).
Among decisions declaring unconstitutionality have been those
invalidating laws restricting the autonomy of the municipalities;
enlarging or altering the constitutional precepts as to nationality;
granting monopolies on old established industries and commerce, as
infringing the freedom of work, commerce and interest (such grant
can be made only as to new discoveries and new industries); and muni-
cipal prohibitions on the export of products or fixing prices. One
law confiscating the property of the deceased dictator G6mez was held
unconstitutional; others were upheld.
Since the electoral body does not constitute a Public Power in
the sense of the constitution, the Supreme Court exercises no juris-
141; But in Ferrari v. Fisco (1938), a legislative authorization to the Jockey Club
to sell race tickets was held not to constitute a vested right; the Legislature could
revoke it. Boraffio, op. cit. supra note 143 at 16.
146 Borafflo, Id. at 10-31.
147 "Feuille: Federal Supreme Court of Venezuela," 5 Texas L. Rev. 41 (1926);
Loreto, Luis, "El control jurisdiccional de la constitucionalidad de las leyes," 41 Revista
de Derecho y Legislacion (Caracas, 1952) 80; Ruggeri Parra, and La Supremacia de la
Constitucion y su Defensa. Jurisprudencia del Alto Tribunal Venezolano (1870-1940).
Caracas, 1941; Sequera, Carlos: El Control Jurisdiccional de la Constitucionalidad
Intrinseca de las Leyes. (Caracas, 1939).
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diction over elections. The court upheld the constitutionality of an
article of the Education Law (later embodied in the Labor Law)
obligating certain employers to maintain schools for their laborers
and for the children of laborers. The court has also passed on ques-
tions involving freedom of teaching with somewhat inconsistent de-
cisions as to the extent of the State's right to regulate. The consti-
tutional guaranty of equality of taxation does not inhibit the national
legislature, but only the states and municipalities, from granting ex-
emptions from taxation. Civilians have been held subject to military
tribunals for ordinary crimes only when acting as accomplices to
military crimes. The constitutional provision against retroactive laws
extends to laws of public order or policy (in our phraseology, it con-
trols the police power).
EFFECT OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
In the United States, the original theory was that a declaration of
unconstitutionality applies only to the specific case. The law is held
to be null and void ab initio. Of course, although the statute theo-
retically remains on the books, it is in fact dead.
Our original theory is followed in Argentina, formerly in Brazil,
as a result of our decisions, and in Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico
and Uruguay by virtue of the wording of the constitutional pro-
visions. The decision is inter partes, not erga omnes.48
Under the popular or public action by any citizen or group of
citizens, the practical effect is the repeal of the statute, but without
retroactive effect, in Colombia, Cuba, Panama, and semble El
Salvador.'49
The Colombian viewpoint is shown by the reasoning of the
Supreme Court:
If (the judgments) had a retroactive effect and were to
annul laws ab initio, there would be no right that was stable and
social insecurity, alarm and anxiety would be permanent and in-
crease daily. 150
Reasons of public policy require that unenforceability pro-
148 Arg., Ghigliani 92-103, Casiella 130, Hronrich-Novarro 112; Brazil, Wald 137-
138; Guat., Grant, 3 Am. J. Comp. L. 186-190 (1954); Chile, Carvajal Ravest 152;
Mexico, Tena, 432, 433, 467, 481-483; Burgoa 222-225; Leon Orantes, 26; Uru., Macedo
187; and 1952 constitution, art. 259; Bolivia, Trigo 683, 684.
149 Pan., Goytia IX; S.C. Nov. 21, 1947, Goytia Nos. 85, 86, pp. 110, 113. El Salv.,
Aguirre Cardona, La Historia Constitucional de el Salvador, 163 seq. (1954). Some of
the Argentine provincial constitutions state that a declaration of unconstitutionality of
a local statute by provincial Supreme Court causes the law to lapse, e.g. Chaco, art. 9,
amparo Melamed S.T. Resistencia, March 3, 1959; La Ley, Mar. 9, 1960, 5. Dana
Montafio, note 17 supra.
150 5 Orozco Ochoa: Jurisprudencia de la Corte Suprema de Justida No. 4260.
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duce no effects as to the past.., it is undeniable that there would
be (social insecurity) since all citizens in their transactions and
operations must go by the law which is in force for such affairs
and proceed in accordance with that law. So that if a judgment of
unenforceability of that law were to disregard the effects it had
produced, the legal relations of the parties interested in the acts
and contracts would lack any stability whatsoever. 151
In Cuba under the 1901 constitution, the effect was only as to
the specific case, the law remaining in full force and effect. By a law
of March 17, 1922, a declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute
or decree in more than two cases obligated the authority which had
issued it to repeal or amend it within twenty days after publication
in the Official Gazette. If no action was taken, the impugned pro-
vision lost all efficacy and ceased to be obligatory. This was changed
by Constitutional Law of 1934 (art. 78(5)): upon a single declaration
by the Supreme Tribunal, of the unconstitutionality of a law, etc., it
cannot again be applied in any manner or under any pretext.
Distinction, however, is made between a private action and the
public action. As in Colombia, a declaration in a public action has
no retroactive effect; it looks only to the future. In the private action,
the law is the same as ours; the unconstitutional action is null and
void ab initio. But in both instances, the unconstitutional law is
annulled for the future.'
In Brazil, a declaration of unconstitutionality annuls the offend-
ing law and it becomes the duty of the Senate to suspend it.
15 3
In Venezuela when the courts in the course of their ordinary
judicial decision find a law to be in conflict with the constitution,
they go no further than to give preference to the constitution (Code
of Civil Procedure, art. 7). The decision is solely res judicata inter
partes. But when the issue of constitutionality is raised in the Federal
Court, in a popular action, the court goes further and declares, as
provided in the constitution, the nullity of the unconstitutional law or
decree. In the first case, the decision has only a limited effect, be-
tween the parties in the cause; the law, apart from that specific case,
continues in force. In the case of a decision by the Federal Court,
under the extraordinary remedy of unconstitutionality, the law is not
151 Soffia G., May 29, 1933; 39 G.J. 1, 2. There may be an exception to the rule
where vested rights have been violated (Landinez de Martinez v. The Nation, 23 Feb.
1927, 34 G.J. 126, 127). There is a trend in the United States to mitigate the rigor
of the rule that unconstitutional statutes are wholly void ab initio. 16 C.J.S. "Consti-
tutional Law" § 101 at 469-481 (1956); TUNC No. 255, 294-297.
152 Infiesta, 110 et. seq.; Garceran, 122, 123, 173, 249-250 (noting dissenting opin-
ions) 437-474.
153 Jacques, supra note 42, 279-280. There would seem to be no means to compel
the Senate to do so. Similarly in the U.S., 16 C.J.S. "Constitutional Law" § 65 at 178
(1956).
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technically repealed, but it is declared void ab initio. The decision
as to constitutionality or unconstitutionality has a general and obliga-
tory effect binding on all citizens and authorities. It is res judicata
inter omnes. This has been repeatedly decided by the court. 154
The rule that a decision of unconstitutionality is applicable only
to the specific case seems to be an unfortunate one. It certainly leads
to a multiplicity of actions. Each aggrieved person has to bring an
action for self-protection. The possibility of a test case is ruled out.
The statute remaining in full force, except as to the particular parties,
it is held in Mexico that the state courts and administrative authorities
have to apply it.-55 The same is true in Chile and Uruguay. In one
case, in the Argentine, the principle was carried to an extreme. A tax
law had been declared unconstitutional and the return of the taxes that
had been paid was ordered. The court rejected a later demand for the
return of taxes paid after the original complaint had been filed,
saying: 156
Although the situation of the plaintiff relative to the new
quotas of the tax paid may be identical with those which existed
in respect of the quotas that were the subject-matter of the suit,
the unconstitutionality declared has no effect except as to the
amount, return of which was the subject of the complaint andjudgment.
Many aspects of the scope of judicial review must be omitted for
lack of space. Habeas corpus has been extended in several countries
to cover all constitutional individual guarantees and is used to test
the constitutionality of legislation. The suspension of the writ and
of other constitutional guarantees under martial law or a "state of
siege"; de facto and revolutionary governments, of which there have
been numerous examples: delegation of powers and the omnipotence
of the Executive; the power of the courts as to constitutional amend-
ments; their treatment of political questions, including treaties; the
structure of federalism in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, differing
from our own in noteworthy particulars; all these and other topics,
vitally affecting the scope and practice of judicial review, are fas-
cinating topics for research and of the highest practical importance. 5 7
154 Sequera, supra note 147, 11-14, 71, 108; 2 Wolf 172-177.
155 Tena Ramirez (4th ed.) 489.
156 Pereyra Iraola v. Prov. of BA., S.C. Oct. 17, 1923; 139 Falos 65.
157 Among the writings in English on some of these highly controversial subjects
may be mentioned: Irizary y Puente, "Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in Latin
America," 36 Am. J. Int'l Law 252 (1942); "International Extradition in Latin America,"
28 Mich. L. Rev. 665 (1930); "'De Facto' Government," 30 Tul. L. Rev. 15 (1955);
Tannenbaum, "The Political Dilemma in Latin America," 38 Foreign Affairs 497 (1960);
Garcia Calderon, Latin America (1913); Baggett, "Delegation of Legislative Powers to
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CONCLUSION
Our study reveals many encouraging factors to offset a melan-
choly picture. The ills that beset underdeveloped Latin American
countries cannot be cured by a constitution however wise-the prob-
lems are far deeper-but they can be aggravated or their cure retarded
by a constitution ill adapted to their historical traditions and their
special needs. It may well be that some countries are not yet ripe
for judicial review. New legal techniques, like modern findings in
science and technology, must first develop, by a slow process of edu-
cation, an appropriate milieu before they can be absorbed into the
lifestream of presently backward countries. The influence of our
American tradition and system may not necessarily be beneficial. Far
better is it for each country to evolve its own institutions than copy
foreign models. Mexico, Colombia and Brazil set an example. Judicial
review can thrive only where there is a strong independent judiciary,
lacking for one cause or another in many nations. Chile with its
ingenious system of choosing judges from nominations made by the
Supreme Court itself has the best record in this respect. In countries
where the calibre of the judges is high, as in Chile and Uruguay,
they might well be entrusted with broader powers than they now
exercise.
Among factors that have contributed to the acceptance of the
doctrine of judicial review, two may be specially noted. One is the
tendency to abandon a traditional proclivity to eloquent pronounce-
ments devoid of any practical rules to enforce the noble purposes
they proclaim, by incorporating practical rules. That curious mixture
or contrast in the Spanish character, typified by Don Quixote and
Sancho Panza, of impractical idealism and earthy common sense,
runs through all the history of Spanish America. In the written consti-
tutions Quixote long prevailed. The other factor that is contributing
to the growth of judicial review is a change of view as to the functions
of the judiciary. The Montesquieu doctrine that the judge is only
the mouthpiece of the law, a slot machine, the "mechanical" theory
of the judicial function, is giving place to a recognition of the creative
role of the judiciary.1 5s The writings of the leading, and most con-
troversial, Latin American legal philosopher, Carlos Cossio, have
the Executive in Mexico," 8 So. Cal. L. Rev. 114 (1935); Dana Montafio, "The Con-
stitutional Problem of the Argentine Republic," 6 Am. J. Comp. Law 340 (1957); De
Sa Freire Basilio, "Judicial Power as a Guarantee of Individual Rights," Proc. Tenth
Inter-Am. Bar Conf. (Buenos Aires, 1958) 205. Latin American references will be fur-
nished on request.
158 Couture, "The Nature of Judicial Process," 25 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1950).
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contributed to lay the philosophical foundation for this change of
attitude.
The scope of judicial review in effect has been severely limited
in the later constitutions by their sweeping provisions as to social
welfare in its broadest sense (labor relations, family, education, the
exaggeration of the theory that property is a social function). The
new constitutions, beginning with Mexico in 1917, contain a mass
of contradictory ideas and repudiate radically the basic principles of
classical constitutionalism. Individual liberty is sacrificed to vague
concepts of social justice; the State may intervene in all spheres of
activity, invading the home alike with all branches of work. Under
the pervasive sweep of these provisions, the most outrageous legisla-
tion could find shelter. Latin America is at present undergoing violent
changes; social reforms, long overdue, are under way. The growing
respect for judicial review may be a factor that may help to curb
excesses and, in the defense of civil rights, to transform the social
system within the bounds of true democracy. It is not enough that
legislation be "constitutional." The constitutions themselves must
meet the requirements of the rule of law and conform to international
standards of justice. Otherwise economic paralysis will set in,
personal liberty vanish and what is intended to be the salvation of
the masses will spell their doom. Misled by demagogues or dreamers,
some nations are blithely unaware they are treading the brimstone
path to moral and economic ruin.
But the dangers for democracy and for individual liberties in
many Latin American countries arise not so much from an inde-
pendent legislature as from an unduly strong Executive power. The
main problem, and it can be solved only by education and political
culture, especially in the Army, is to curb arbitrary exercise of
power and to subjugate the Executive to the reign or supremacy of
law. This is a task primarily for the lawyers of the hemisphere-
heretofore their eloquent defense of liberty has not reached the
masses, but only the 6lite. Judicial review is serving a useful edu-
cational function. This is perhaps its greatest contribution. In many
countries, the courts have been successful in furnishing protection
against arbitrary action by local officials. Amparo is dear to the
people in Mexico and habeas corpus in Brazil, because there is a
resort to a Supreme Court, independent of local influences. Should
the courts ever rise to a position where they cin, with equal popu-
larity, confront the highest power of the State, much will be achieved.
Progress towards true constitutional government has been made.
Much is still to be achieved. The auguries are hopeful.
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